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RETHINKING THE PARAMETERS OF TRADEMARK USE IN
ENTERTAINMENT
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt*
Abstract
Trademark law is flawed in its approach to trademark uses in
entertainment. Infringement turns on whether a consumer is likely to be
confused into believing that a markholder sponsored or approved of the
use. Because consumers are increasingly aware of product placement and
other sponsored mark uses, this likelihood of confusion standard may be
met, and infringement found, even for harmless and/or artistically relevant
uses, such as uses for purposes of verisimilitude or uses that rely on a
mark’s symbolic meaning to assist in conveying a work’s message. This
increased likelihood of confusion chills speech by forcing content creators
to choose between licensing marks and avoiding marks altogether.
Ironically, because negative depictions of marks are less likely to confuse
consumers and because trademark dilution law does not apply to
expressive uses of marks, trademark law permits gratuitously negative
depictions of marks, which may harm markholders. The result is a
doctrinally imbalanced system that chills speech, increases the transaction
costs of content creation, and disproportionately harms small or
independent content creators, while still permitting potentially harmful
uses.
There is a solution to this problem: rather than applying the traditional
likelihood of confusion and dilution analyses, unauthorized uses of marks
should be permitted in an expressive setting unless the use is (1) not
artistically relevant or (2) explicitly misleading. This test is based on
factors identified by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers v.
Grimaldi, but differs from that court’s analysis in two significant ways.
First, the Rogers approach requires the court to perform a traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis and then to balance likelihood of
confusion against the public interest in freedom of expression. The
proposed test avoids the likelihood of confusion analysis entirely. Second,
the proposed test applies a presumption of artistic relevance. This simpler
scheme would permit the use of marks as expressive tools, while
encouraging content creators to seek permission for uses that are more
likely to harm a mark’s source-identifying function.
* Assistant Professor, Whittier Law School. J.D. Harvard Law School, B.A., Williams
College. This Article was written in conjunction with a fellowship in intellectual property law at
UCLA School of Law and work as an Adjunct Professor at the University of Southern California
Gould School of Law. Thanks to Douglas Lichtman, Wendy Seltzer, Jane Shay Wald, Mary Ann
Novak, Jonathan Weinberg, David Welkowitz, and the many other wise people who asked probing
questions as I presented this paper as a work in progress. Andrew Weiss, Andrew Fogg, and Julia
and Albert Rosenblatt also offered invaluable assistance. Thanks, also, to Judy Daar and the warm
and welcoming faculty at the Whittier Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world in which James Bond drove a Honda Civic instead of
an Aston Martin and Carrie Bradshaw wore Birkenstocks instead of
Manolo Blahniks.
Envision Kanye West’s “Gold Digger” seeking a “car” and a “purse”
instead of a “Benz” and a “Louis Vuitton.”
Can the game Battlefield Vietnam seem as real without “Huey”
helicopters (a brand owned by Bell Helicopter)? And what should The
Devil Wear, if not Prada?
Brand names tell stories. And yet, content creators’ decisions regarding
whether and when to use trademarks in entertainment—films, television,
music, visual art, fiction, video games—are increasingly influenced by the
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desire to avoid trademark litigation and possible liability.1 This Article
explores the principles that underlie current restrictions on the use of
trademarks in entertainment, reevaluates those restrictions as they are
applied in practice, and concludes that the current parameters must be
clarified and adjusted in order to avoid a doctrinal imbalance that both
overprotects and underprotects.
This imbalance originates in an ambiguous doctrine that relies on
consumers’ awareness of product placement and mark licensing practices
and consumers’ own understanding of what the law requires as key
elements in determining infringement (resulting in overprotection) while
undervaluing the potential for harm that may result from an unfavorable
depiction of a mark in an expressive setting (resulting in potential
underprotection).
Overprotection under current law results partially from the traditional
“likelihood of confusion” analysis, which assesses whether consumers are
likely to be misled into believing that a markholder has sponsored or
approved a particular mark use. In making this assessment, courts examine
a number of factors: (1) the strength of the allegedly infringed mark; (2)
the proximity (i.e. competitive similarity) of the goods represented by the
mark; (3) the similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion,
including survey evidence; (5) overlap in marketing channels used by the
goods; (6) the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised
by the purchaser; (7) the alleged infringer’s intent in selecting the mark;
and (8) the likelihood that the product lines will expand to compete with
each other.2 Examining the factors, it is apparent that this analysis is
primarily designed to address the problem of “passing off”—that is, when
a mark is imitated or otherwise used to mislead consumers as to the source
of goods or services that might compete with the markholder’s. But these
factors are a poor tool for evaluating the question of “sponsorship or
approval,” in which a mark is used to represent its own product or service,
and the question is whether the mark’s owner sponsored or approved of the
mark’s use. In the sponsorship-or-approval setting, the analysis must focus
inordinately on consumer surveys (a frequent tool in assessing
infringement), and the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis thus
becomes overly susceptible to distortion from consumers’ growing
awareness of product placement and other sponsored mark uses.
Combined with risk aversion, pressure from insurance carriers, and a
lack of clarity in the law, these factors have created a culture of overcaution regarding the use of marks in entertainment, in which content
creators frequently avoid the expressive use of marks and obscure
unauthorized use of marks. This not only exacerbates consumers’
1. For expediency, the terms “trademark” and “mark” will be used throughout this Article to
refer to trademarks, service marks, and trade dress.
2. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).
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misperceptions regarding when the use of marks must be authorized, but
also unduly restricts the ability of content creators to depict the real world
with authenticity (i.e., verisimilitude) and to use the expressive aspects of
marks as cultural icons.
At the same time, current law may also underprotect marks, by
declining to find either confusion or dilution when a mark is gratuitously
depicted in a negative light. Marks depicted in a negative light are
generally not likely to confuse consumers into believing that the
markholder has sponsored or approved of the use. Negative uses will
therefore be permitted even when they may harm markholders by creating
a negative association in the minds of consumers. Moreover, dilution laws,
which would usually forbid such tarnishing depictions, are seldom applied
to uses of marks in entertainment (positive or negative), because of
ambiguities in the law and because of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act’s provision that dilution occurs only when the use of a mark
constitutes “commercial” speech rather than expressive speech.3 Thus,
dilution law does not step in to address any potential harm that may arise
from gratuitously negative depictions. Ultimately, current law creates a
doctrinally imbalanced system that chills speech, increases the transaction
costs of content creation, and disproportionately harms small or
independent content creators.
To remedy this situation, the law should be clarified and adjusted to
allow content creators the freedom to use marks without authorization in
artistically relevant settings, while protecting markholders against
gratuitously harmful depictions of marks. Both goals would be satisfied by
replacing the traditional likelihood of confusion test and the dilution test in
the expressive-use context with a simple two-pronged test, under which the
use of a mark would be permitted unless the use is (1) not artistically
relevant or (2) explicitly misleading. A use would be found to lack artistic
relevance only if there were no artistic reason whatsoever to include the
mark in the work. Uses for purposes of verisimilitude, symbolism, parody,
practical necessity, or other artistic justifications would fall well within
bounds of artistic relevance. As to the second prong, a use would be
explicitly misleading if it contained an explicit and false representation that
the markholder sponsored, approved of, or was affiliated with the work, or
if the work explicitly called out the mark as part of promoting the work.
This proposed test is a modification of a two-prong analysis introduced
in Rogers v. Grimaldi, which deemed a trademark use worthy of First
Amendment consideration if the use was (1) artistically relevant and (2)
not explicitly misleading.4 The proposed test, however, differs from the
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006).
4. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999–1002 (2d Cir. 1989). This case concerned the film
Ginger and Fred, directed by Federico Fellini. Id. The film was not about Ginger Rogers and Fred
Astaire; rather, it was about two Italian dancers who were nicknamed after the more famous duo.
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Rogers analysis in two significant ways. First, Rogers requires the court to
perform a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis in addition to the
two-pronged test above and then to balance likelihood of confusion against
the public interest in freedom of expression. The proposed test, on the
other hand, avoids the likelihood of confusion analysis entirely. Second,
unlike Rogers, the proposed test applies a presumption of artistic
relevance, which adds clarity and tends to discourage speculative litigation.
Social science research indicates that consumers are more likely to
presume that the use of a mark is sponsored or approved and are more
likely to come away with a negative perception of the mark if the use is not
artistically relevant. Therefore, replacing the traditional likelihood of
confusion or dilution analyses with this two-pronged test would not only
capture the uses most likely to create a likelihood of confusion, but also
capture the uses most likely to create trademark harm. In addition, by
barring artistically irrelevant uses, the proposed test would eliminate
gratuitously harmful uses, while permitting artistically relevant negative
uses such as parody and criticism. Thus, the test would create a consistent
standard that would allow content creators maximum freedom to use marks
as expressive tools with minimum harm to markholders.
Several commentators have written about the use of trademarks in
entertainment. In particular, James Gibson has insightfully explored the
expansion of trademark liability through the recursive impact of risk
aversion, product placement, and doctrinal ambiguity,5 and others such as
Pratheepan Gulasekaram and Daniel E. Newman have argued for greater
freedom to use marks in entertainment.6 Other commentators have
addressed government regulation of product placement in entertainment
and the degree to which product placements should receive First
Amendment protection.7 Scholars have paid much attention to the limits
Ginger Rogers sued the producers, arguing that the film’s title falsely implied that she sponsored or
approved of the film. Id. Ruling against Rogers, the Second Circuit held that film titles are entitled
to First Amendment protection, and applied a balancing test wherein trademark uses are protected
as First Amendment speech if they are artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading, and the
likelihood of confusion does not outweigh the public interest in free expression. Id.
5. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 913 (2007).
6. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing The Border Between Trademarks And Free Speech:
Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use In Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 908–10
(2005); Daniel E. Newman, Portraying a Branded World, 2008 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 357,
367–79 (2008).
7. William B. Lackey, Can Lois Lane Smoke Marlboros?: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Regulating Product Placement in Movies, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 275, 276;
Sandra Lee, Product Placement in the United States: A Revolution in Need of Regulation, 26
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 203, 212–13 (2008); Benjamin R. Mulcahy, That’s Advertainment!,
LOS ANGELES LAW., May 2006, at 46; Matthew Savare, Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood
And Vine: The Business, Legal, And Creative Ramifications Of Product Placements, 11 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 331, 369–76 (2004); Scott Shagin & Matthew Savare, Lawyering at the Intersection of
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that copyright law may impose on content creators’ ability to incorporate
existing works into the context of larger expressive works, especially in the
face of a lawsuit concerning the use of a copyrighted prop in the television
show Roc,8 and other similar disputes.9 This has given rise to projects such
as the Center for Social Media’s “Untold Stories: Creative Consequences
of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers” (which
addresses a variety of intellectual property issues) and “Documentary
Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use,” (which focuses on
copyright fair use).10 In the trademark context, a number of commentators
have noted the expressive nature of trademarks, and identified ways in
which trademark law may unduly chill speech.11 By comparison, relatively
little exploration has taken place regarding the effect of trademark law on
freedom of expression in light of the growing practice of product
placement.12 While this Article builds on James Gibson’s work, it diverges
Madison and Vine: It’s About Brand Integration, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 2005, at 34.
8. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1997).
9. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY (2008) (discussing the incorporation of copyrighted works into other works);
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 3–4 (2001); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50
B.C. L. REV. 139, 151–53 (2009); Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 715, 722–28 (2007); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 433, 447–50 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine
Harms Free Speech And How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545–47 (2004).
10. See generally PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, UNTOLD
STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY
FILMMAKERS (2004), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/printable_rights
report.pdf (addressing the impact of clearance culture on a variety of intellectual property issues);
CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES FOR FAIR USE
(2005), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/fair_use_final.pdf (focusing on copyright fair
use issues in light of the clearance culture).
11. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 158–60;
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks As Language In The Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 400–12 (1990) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be
Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 123, 125–37 (1996) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols]; Tara J. Goldsmith, What’s
Wrong With This Picture? When The Lanham Act Clashes With Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 837–52 (1997); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 84
TRADEMARK REP. 441, 454–58 (1994); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1710–13 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The
Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1728–31 (1999); William McGeveran,
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 61–66 (2008).
12. Cf. MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., WILL FAIR USE
SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL (2005),
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf (discussing effect of trademark
cease and desist demands on free expression).
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from Gibson’s goal of slowing rights accretion and Gulasekaram’s freeexpression objective. Instead, this Article examines the roots and effects
not only of trademark law’s overprotection of marks in entertainment, but
also of its underprotection, and proposes a remedy for this doctrinal
imbalance.
Part II of this Article describes the legal and practical landscapes that
have created this situation and the ways in which current doctrine leads to
harmful results. Part III explores the failings of the current system,
including its ambiguity and its failure to focus on the types of uses that are
most likely to lead to trademark harm. Current doctrines such as classic fair
use, nominative fair use, Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
regulations, the requirement that a use does not infringe unless it uses the
mark “as a trademark,” and the First Amendment analysis set forth in
Rogers are, on their own, inadequate to redress these issues without more
dramatic steps. The two-pronged analysis performed in Rogers is a good
start, however. Because unauthorized uses are most likely to cause
trademark harm if they appear without artistic justification, this Article
proposes that courts examining the unauthorized use of a trademark in an
expressive context should replace the traditional likelihood of confusion
and dilution tests with an inquiry into whether the use is (1) not artistically
relevant or (2) explicitly misleading. Under this proposal, expressive
trademark uses that are artistically irrelevant or explicitly misleading
would infringe, while expressive uses that are artistically relevant without
being explicitly misleading would not, regardless of whether they satisfy a
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis. This proposed test would
permit the use of marks as expressive tools, while encouraging content
creators to seek permission for uses that are more likely to harm a mark’s
source-identifying function.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE
To envision the ideal parameters for the use of trademarks in
entertainment, it is helpful to begin by reviewing the considerations that
shape the protection of trademarks in the first place. Regarding the legal
parameters, we must ask: What limitations exist on the use of trademarks,
and why? What policies underlie a trademark owner’s right to prevent
others from using its mark, and what policies underlie the limits placed on
that right? Regarding the practical parameters, we must question: How are
marks used as icons and communicative tools, and what are the limits on
these uses (authorized or unauthorized)? What are the customs and
practices of the entertainment industry regarding the use of marks, and how
do these customs and practices influence the law?
After analyzing these existing parameters, one can understand how they
result in overprotection and underprotection, and how the rules and
practices currently governing the use of trademarks in entertainment need
to be adjusted.
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A. The Legal Landscape
Trademarks exist primarily to identify the source of goods and services.
The trademark system relies on the premise that when a consumer
perceives a trademark in connection with a particular good or service, the
consumer will associate that mark with a source for that good or service.
The Lanham Act permits markholders to police the integrity of the system
by ensuring that their marks are not used by others in ways likely to
confuse consumers into believing falsely that the markholder produces,
approves of, sponsors, or is otherwise affiliated with an unauthorized use
of the mark.13 That way, consumers experience consistency; consumers
who perceive a given trademark in connection with goods or services can
assume accurately that the goods or services originated from or are
associated with the same entity as other goods and services associated with
that mark.14 Because consumers can trust that the holder of any given mark
sponsors or approves of all goods or services identified by that mark, they
can trust that goods sharing the same mark are likely to be the same or to
have similar qualities.15 A glance at the cereal aisle of a supermarket
demonstrates the practical utility of the system: trademarks allow
consumers to trust that any two boxes that contain the “Cheerios” mark
contain the same type of product as each other, any two boxes that contain
the “General Mills” mark originate from the same company as each other,
and any two boxes that contain the “Kashi” mark are both likely to contain
cereal made from organic grain.
The system protects markholders as well as consumers by allowing
markholders to develop reputations. As the Supreme Court explained in
1879, marks “are the symbols by which men engaged in trade and
manufactures become known in the marts of commerce, by which their
reputation and that of their goods are extended and published; and as they
become better known, the profits of their business are enhanced.”16 Thus, a
mark represents both a product and the markholder who stands behind it;
every mark carries with it not only a message of product quality but also a
brand image or corporate identity. Accordingly, a markholder may drive
sales by developing a reputation for high-quality or stylish goods, and may
enhance the selling power of its mark by developing a reputation for
philanthropy, event sponsorship, or other activities that color its brand
image.17 Trademark law therefore protects not only against confusion as to
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
14. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–70 (1987).
15. Id. at 269–70.
16. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 87 (1879) (statement preceding opinion). Although
the statement’s gendered language stands out as outdated, the core sentiment remains true today.
17. For example, McDonald’s sponsors the Ronald McDonald House Charities, see Ronald
McDonald House Charities, http://www.rmhc.com/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009) (providing “a ‘home
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the source of a product or service (and accompanying consumer confusion
regarding product quality), but also against confusion as to markholder
sponsorship or approval of a product or service. This latter type of
protection allows markholders to safeguard their reputations and brand
identities (as distinguished from product quality per se), but as discussed
by commentators including Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna, this
protection may also overreach in ways that unduly curb expression.18 This
overreaching is at the core of the dilemma discussed in this Article.
Overreaching aside, trademark protection exists for good reason. When
a mark is used in a way that is likely to confuse consumers or to dilute the
source-identifying function of a famous mark, that use is likely to harm
both consumers and markholders by harming the predictability function of
the mark to consumers, diminishing the markholder’s incentive to create
consistent goods, and undercutting the mark’s value to the markholder
(among other things). In order to prevent these (related) harms, the Lanham
Act prohibits two types of trademark uses: (1) uses likely to confuse
consumers, and (2) uses likely to dilute the source-identifying function of a
mark.
Sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibit the unauthorized
use of marks in a manner likely to confuse consumers.19 Specifically, the
Lanham Act prohibits the use of marks in connection with the sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services in a way that is likely to
cause confusion as to affiliation, connection, or association with the
markholder or confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of goods
or services.20 The touchstone of infringement under these provisions is
likelihood of confusion: Is the use of a mark likely to confuse consumers
into believing falsely that a product or service is associated with the

away from home’ for families of seriously ill children receiving treatment at nearby hospitals”),
Coca-Cola sponsors the Coca-Cola Refreshing Filmmaker’s Award, see Coca-Cola Refreshing
Filmmaker’s Award, http://www.ccrfa.com/ccrfa/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009), (awarding annual
monetary award and promotion for emerging filmmakers from America’s top film schools), and
Acura visibly sponsors the Los Angeles Philharmonic, see, e.g., Press Release, Los Angeles
Philharmonic, Dave Brubeck Quartet Kicks Off LA Phil’s 2008/09 Jazz Series at Walt Disney
Concert Hall (Oct. 26, 2008), http://www.laphil.com/press/press_release/index.cfm?id=2317
(“Concert generously sponsored by Acura, the official Automotive Sponsor of the Los Angeles
Philharmonic [and] All Acura Vehicles Park Free for the Evening.”). Each of these enhances the
brand’s image: McDonald’s comes across as child- and family-friendly, Coca-Cola as exciting and
adventurous, and Acura as cultured and elegant.
18. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STANFORD L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://paper.ssrn.com/sol/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1407793#.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (relating to infringement of
registered and unregistered marks, respectively).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (prohibiting the use of a mark that “is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the . . . origin, sponsorship, or approval
of . . . goods, services, or commercial activities”).
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markholder in any of the enumerated ways?21 The traditional likelihood of
confusion test relies on a non-exclusive list of factors, including (1) the
strength of the allegedly infringed mark; (2) the proximity (i.e. competitive
similarity) of the goods; (3) the similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of
actual confusion, including survey evidence; (5) overlap in marketing
channels used by the goods; (6) the type of goods and the degree of care
likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) the alleged infringer’s intent in
selecting the mark; and (8) the likelihood that the product lines will expand
to compete with each other.22
Whether confusion is found to be likely thus depends not only on
factors such as the strength of the allegedly infringed mark and the
similarity of the products, but also to some degree on consumers’
understanding of trademark law. If consumers believe that a particular kind
of trademark use must always be authorized by the markholder, then
consumers will infer that any such use implies sponsorship or approval by
the markholder and an unauthorized use becomes, by definition, an
infringement.23 Consumer surveys, a frequent tool in assessing
infringement, reflect this effect.24 Such surveys often ask whether
consumers believe that “permission” was required for the challenged use,
in essence translating consumers’ opinions about the relevant law into a
ruling on infringement.25
In addition to prohibiting uses likely to confuse, the Lanham Act bars
the unauthorized use of marks in a manner likely to weaken (or “dilute”)
the source-identifying function of those marks, even if the use is not
confusing. Specifically, section 43(c) of the Lanham Act prohibits uses that
are likely to dilute famous trademarks through “blurring,” which is creating
an association that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark; or
“tarnishment,” which is creating an association that harms the reputation of

21. Id.
22. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
23. Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989); Gibson, supra note 5,
at 907–08.
24. Gibson, supra note 5, at 907–08. Consumer surveys are considered evidence of “actual
confusion.” Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 1998). They have
become important litigation tools and are sufficiently commonplace that failure to present survey
evidence may be held against a markholder in the form of a presumption that actual confusion is
unlikely. See id. (relying on “presumption that plaintiffs’ failure to conduct a survey indicates the
results of such a survey would be unfavorable for plaintiffs”).
25. See, e.g., CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2006);
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544 (5th Cir. 1998); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1994); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel
I), 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1132–33 (C.D. Cal. 1998). But see Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc.,
525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (criticizing “permission” surveys as seeking a legal
conclusion).
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the famous mark.26 The Lanham Act excludes from dilution liability
certain types of uses deemed to be “fair” for dilution purposes, such as
comparative advertising, parody and criticism of the markholder, and news
reporting and commentary.27 In addition, the Lanham Act contains two
provisions that limit dilution liability to commercial uses—first, the Act
applies only to use of a mark “in commerce,”28 and second, the Act
explicitly exempts from liability any “noncommercial use of a mark.”29
This non-commercial use exemption tracks the distinction between
commercial and expressive use in the First Amendment context, wherein a
use that does more than simply propose a commercial transaction is
deemed non-commercial.30
Dilution’s non-commercial use exemption is one of several trademark
doctrines designed to ensure that trademark does not unduly abridge
speech. A trademark holder does not have the unfettered right to exclude
others from using its mark. This differs from patent and copyright law:
Patent holders have the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling their inventions,31 and copyright holders have the right to exclude
others from doing the bundle of activities protected by copyright law.32 In
contrast, trademark holders have the right to exclude others from using
their marks only to the extent that such use is confusing or dilutive as
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). In the words of the Ninth Circuit, dilution occurs where use of a
trademark “whittle[s] away . . . the value of a trademark” by “blurring [its] uniqueness and
singularity” or by “tarnishing [it] with negative associations.” Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.
(Mattel II), 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006).
30. See Mattel II, 296 F.3d at 905–06 (analyzing legislative history and ruling that the song
Barbie Girl was not a commercial use and thus did not dilute Mattel’s mark). Generally, courts
afford the greatest degree of First Amendment protection to news and political information. See,
e.g., Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Constitution
stands as a safe harbor for all but the most malicious political speech.”). Entertainment speech
enjoys a slightly lesser degree of First Amendment protection. See Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (“Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is
protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such
as musical and dramatic works fall within the First Amendment guarantee.”); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“The law generally recognizes a
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”). The First Amendment
shields commercial speech to a significantly lesser degree. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535
U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (“Although commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, not all
regulation of such speech is unconstitutional.”). The profit-making nature of entertainment speech
does not render it “commercial.” See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952)
(“That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them
from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to
see why operation for profit should have any different effect in the case of motion pictures.”).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 501.
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defined by the Lanham Act. This distinction reflects the origins of each
type of protection; copyright and patent law originate in the Constitution’s
promise of an intellectual property system that “promote[s] the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”33 Trademark law, on the other hand, finds its roots in the
Commerce Clause.34 Thus, trademark law is less concerned with providing
exclusive rights than it is with facilitating the commercial, i.e. sourceidentifying, function of marks. Hence the rule of thumb that a trademark is
not a “right in gross.”35
In that spirit, trademark doctrine is designed to prevent, to the extent
possible, any constriction of the public vocabulary.36 Ideally, trademarks
should expand the universal lexicon by providing communicative tools that
represent products and services, rather than removing communicative tools
from public use.37 Thus, a generic term, i.e. the common descriptive name
of a particular good or service, such as the term “apple” to describe apples,
cannot be protected as a trademark.38 Permitting protection for such terms
would risk leaving the public without a non-branded way of describing a
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); see In re Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94–95 (1879).
35. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1918) (noting a
trademark is not a “right in gross” and “[t]he owner of a trade-mark may not, like the proprietor of a
patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly”). See Lemley,
supra note 11, at 1696–97 (discussing policy basis for adage that trademark is not a right in gross).
36. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 215 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“When a business claims the exclusive right to use words or phrases that are a part of
our common vocabulary, this Court should not depart from the statutorily mandated authority to
‘rectify the register,’ 15 U.S.C. § 1119, absent a clear congressional mandate. Language, even in a
commercial context, properly belongs to the public unless Congress instructs otherwise.”); CarFreshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting importance of
“protect[ing] the right of society at large to use words or images in their primary descriptive
sense”); Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[O]ne competitor
will not be permitted to impoverish the language of commerce by preventing his fellows from fairly
describing their own goods”); Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 1320
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (recognizing the importance of the “free use of the language” in the trademark
context); see also Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461 and S. 895 Before the Subcomm.
on Trade-Marks of the H. Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 72 (1941) (testimony of Wallace Martin,
Chairman, American Bar Association Committee on Trade-Mark Legislation) (“Everybody has got
a right to the use of the English language and has got a right to assume that nobody is going to take
that English language away from him.”).
37. See Mattel II, 296 F.3d at 900 (“Trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a
contemporary flavor to our expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the trademark
becomes a word in our language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.”);
Lemley, supra note 11, at 1696 (discussing the danger of cultural impoverishment when trademarks
are removed from vocabulary).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
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type of good or service.39 For the same reason, a trademark becomes
unprotectably generic when it becomes the common descriptive name of a
type of good or service such that the public no longer perceives the term as
a source identifier (such as “escalator” or “cellophane”).40 Likewise, a term
that is necessarily generic cannot be protected as a trademark even if
consumers have come to associate it with a particular brand, such as
AOL’s use of the generic term “You’ve Got Mail.”41
By the same token, a descriptive term (for example, the term “PARK
‘N FLY” to describe airport parking) cannot be protected as a trademark
unless and until it has acquired “secondary meaning,” also known as
“acquired distinctiveness.”42 This occurs when “the primary significance of
the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the
producer.”43 The reasoning behind this is clear: when a term describes a
particular product or service, it is unduly burdensome on the public
vocabulary to prevent the public from using the term in connection with
that product or service, unless the aspiring markholder can establish that
the term functions as a source identifier rather than a descriptor.44
While these statutory provisions may be aimed at facilitating
competition as much as speech, other provisions are even more clearly
aimed at ensuring that trademark law does not constrict the common
vocabulary or abridge protected speech. For example, the statutory doctrine
39. This doctrine also has a commercial function. See Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d
528, 531–32 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Imagine the pickle that sellers would be in if they were forbidden to
use ‘brassiere,’ ‘cellophane,’ ‘escalator,’ ‘thermos,’ ‘yo-yo,’ or ‘dry ice’ to denote products-all
being former trademarks that have become generic terms. The problem is not that language is so
impoverished that no other words could be used to denote these products, but that if no other words
have emerged as synonyms it may be difficult for a seller forbidden to use one of the trademarked
words or phrases to communicate effectively with consumers.”).
40. Id.; see 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
§ 12:18 (4th ed. 2009) (including list of terms deemed to have become generic).
41. Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 822–23 (4th Cir. 2001).
42. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 215 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
43. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
44. See Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Canal Co. v. Clark, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323–24 (1871) (explaining this principle prior to the advent of the Lanham
Act: “[T]he owner of an original trade-mark has an undoubted right to be protected in the exclusive
use of all the marks, forms, or symbols, that were appropriated as designating the true origin or
ownership of the article or fabric to which they are affixed; but he has no right to the exclusive use
of any words, letters, figures, or symbols, which have no relation to the origin or ownership of the
goods, but are only meant to indicate their names or quality. He has no right to appropriate a sign or
a symbol, which, from the nature of the fact it is used to signify, others may employ with equal
truth, and therefore have an equal right to employ for the same purpose.”). Similarly, colors cannot
be protected as trademarks unless the color serves as a trademark (i.e. has acquired secondary
meaning) and has no significant non-trademark function. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 169–70 (1995) (secondary meaning and non-functionality requirements will prevent
trademark law from unduly restricting color vocabulary).
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of “classic trademark fair use” provides that a descriptive mark may be
used in a descriptive manner, even if doing so creates consumer
confusion.45 Courts have also adopted the doctrine of “nominative fair
use,” which holds that marks can be used to identify the markholder’s good
or service when it is the only practical way to identify the good or service,
provided that no more of the mark is used than necessary, and the use does
nothing to imply sponsorship beyond the use of the mark.46 Thus, a
newspaper running a story about the musical group “New Kids on the
Block” can identify the band by name,47 and a visual artist whose art piece
makes a statement about the cultural impact of Barbie can incorporate the
doll’s trade dress into the art piece.48 Although these uses could lead to
confusion or dilution, the doctrine loosens the markholder’s control over
uses of its mark in order to maintain ease of communication and facilitate
free speech.49
Even more directly aimed at protecting First Amendment speech are the
dilution statute’s exceptions for “all forms of news reporting and news
commentary,” and for “any noncommercial use of a mark,”50 and the
doctrine first articulated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers
v. Grimaldi,51 that the Lanham Act should be construed to apply to artistic
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in First Amendment free expression.52 The
Rogers court held that this First Amendment analysis would be triggered
by the use of a mark in the title of an artistic work “unless the title has no
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some
artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the
content of the work.”53 The Rogers doctrine has not been applied
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (noting it is a defense to trademark infringement “[t]hat
the use . . . charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of . . . a term or device
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of
such party, or their geographic origin”); Id. § 1125(c)(3) (excluding “[a]ny fair use, including a
nominative or descriptive fair use” from dilution liability); see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121–22 (2004) (“some possibility of consumer confusion
must be compatible with fair use . . . . The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion
on the part of consumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an originally
descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the undesirability of allowing
anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first.”).
46. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
47. Id. at 309.
48. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. (Walking Mountain), 353 F.3d 792, 808, 812
(9th Cir. 2003).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006) (excluding “[a]ny fair use, including a nominative or
descriptive fair use” from dilution liability).
50. Id. § 1125(c)(3)(B)–(C) (2006).
51. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
52. Id. at 999.
53. Id.
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consistently in other circuits.54 In circuits that apply the Rogers standard, a
gradual consensus has arisen that it should apply to uses of marks in the
body of an expressive work as well as titular uses.55

54. Although the Rogers test has been explicitly endorsed in some circuits, see Westchester
Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664–65 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Twin Peaks
Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting Rogers standard
with proviso that infringement will still be found if “likelihood of confusion [is] ‘particularly
compelling’”)); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel II, 296 F.3d
894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002), it has been criticized as overly subjective in its requirement that courts
assess artistic relevance, see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 10:31, and has been explicitly avoided
in some circuits, see Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) (explicitly
declining to decide whether to adopt Rogers standard). Moreover, even those circuits that have
adopted the test in some contexts have not uniformly applied the rule to all First Amendment
claims, see Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396, 1403 (9th
Cir. 1997) (relying on pre-Rogers cases to reject a First Amendment defense to trademark
infringement regarding a book about O.J. Simpson styled after “The Cat in the Hat”); Tri-Star
Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time Prods., B.V., 749 F. Supp. 1243, 1252–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998 (noting that Rogers does not apply to “‘confusingly similar titles’” and
holding that Rogers does not protect the film Return From The River Kwai from claim by producers
of Bridge Over The River Kwai)), and other circuits have sought to balance First Amendment
considerations using a different standard, see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d
769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that First Amendment did not protect use of mark in parodic
context when the use was likely to confuse and “the confusion [as opposed to the use of the mark] is
wholly unnecessary to Balducci’s stated purpose”) (emphasis added); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that the
“likelihood of confusion” test “serve[s] to avoid First Amendment concerns” in the case of
trademark parodies; holding that First Amendment trumped any likelihood of confusion regarding
parody baseball cards without applying Rogers v. Grimaldi standard).
55. Compare Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 808 n.14 (expressing uncertainty regarding
whether Rogers standard should be applied to non-titular uses), and Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1015–16
(expressing skepticism re: same), with ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918, 936–37
(6th Cir. 2003) (applying Rogers to a commemorative sports painting of Tiger Woods’s victory at
the Masters golf tournament in 1997), and Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g
Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying balancing test to a trade dress case concerning
the cover of a book, but without reliance on “artistic relevance” standard), and E.S.S. Entm’t 2000,
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1014, 1039–40 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (applying
Rogers to use of “Pig Pen” strip club in video game content in suit by owners of “Play Pen” strip
club mark), and Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 276–78 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (finding that Defendant’s use of certain elements of the cover design of the Old Farmer’s
Almanac to “make[] a joking reference to the Almanac, as part of a socio-economic commentary,”
was “entitled to the protections explained by the Court of Appeals in Rogers v. Grimaldi and Cliffs
Notes”), and Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1551–
53 (S.D. Fla.1990) (holding, in a case where the owner of the trademark “Star Brite” sued the
producers of a fictional television movie that portrayed a fictional company called “Starbrite
Batteries” in a bad light, that the film was “entitled to the full extent of protection afforded by the
[F]irst [A] mendment” but ruling on likelihood of confusion rather than First Amendment grounds);
see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 10:22 (quoting Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495 (“The courts
have expanded the Rogers balancing approach to encompass all ‘works of artistic expression.’”)).
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B. The Practical Landscape
There are a number of reasons a mark might be used in entertainment.
Marks can serve as communicative tools, can express verisimilitude or
characterization, or can act as cultural markers; or marks may be used
because it would be impossible or impractical to make a work without
them. In theory, content creators have many choices in how to approach
the use of marks: A content creator may accept promotional consideration
in exchange for incorporating a mark into a work; a content creator may
compensate a markholder for the use of its mark; or a content creator may
use a mark without authorization. As a practical matter, however, industry
custom, insurance requirements, and fear of trademark litigation have
combined to create a “clearance culture” that forces creators to seek
permission for the use of marks. This increases transaction costs and leads,
ultimately, to stifled creativity and chilled speech. Before discussing how
to address these harmful effects, one must first understand their origin and
operation.
1. Marks as Expression
Several commentators have recognized the value of marks as cultural
icons and communicative tools.56 Because of their ubiquity and symbolic
purpose, marks carry information beyond their mere source-identifying
function. Content creators therefore frequently include marks for purposes
of verisimilitude, to identify fiction occurring in a particular time and place
in the real world, or in non-fiction works (such as documentaries) as a
reflection of the world of the documentary subject.57 For example, the
video game Battlefield Vietnam included Bell Huey helicopters to signify
that its action takes place in the Vietnam War;58 the show Entourage uses
56. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 11 (proposing that marks should be
deemed “generic” for purposes of infringement liability when they are used in their “signaling”
sense as cultural icons in expressive contexts); Kozinski, supra note 11, at 454–58 (observing the
expressive capability of marks: “Some ideas—‘it’s the Rolls-Royce of its class,’ for example—are
difficult to express any other way.”); Litman, supra note 11, at 1730 (discussing value of
trademarks that transcends source identification); Newman, supra note 6 (discussing cultural value
of trademarks).
57. See Lauren P. Smith, Trademarks and the Movies: “An Af-’Fair Use’ to Remember, 48
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 415 (2000).
58. Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint at 4, Bell Helicopter Textron Inc v. Elect. Arts Inc., No.
4:2006cv00841 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2006). When the game was released by Electronic Arts in 2003,
players could elect the Bell 205 (“Huey”) helicopter as a transportation option, as well as Bell AH-1
“Cobra” and AH-1Z “Super Cobra” options. Bell Helicopter sued Electronic Arts for trademark
infringement, arguing that the presence of its helicopters in the game implied Bell’s sponsorship or
affiliation with the game. Id. The case settled on February 15, 2008 after more than a year of
litigation. Players are no longer permitted to elect the Huey as a transportation option (the Huey
image is now identified only as a “transport helicopter”), but other branded transportation options
remain, including Boeing’s CH-47 Chinook helicopter.
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real brands and locations to underscore the fact that it is set in the
contemporary Hollywood scene;59 the show Mad Men uses real period
marks and advertisements to demonstrate that it intends to depict a story
taking place in the real world of 1960s advertising;60 reality television
show The Hills portrays its characters visiting real locations around Los
Angeles to show the world that they live in;61 and the film Super Size Me
uses the McDonald’s mark to identify its documentary subject.62
In addition, marks often gain cultural meaning, often as a result of their
source-identifying function. For example, the Rolls Royce and Louis
Vuitton marks connote luxury and wealth; the McDonalds mark connotes
ubiquity and cheapness (not only in reference to its own products, but also
to coinages such as “McMansion”); and the Betty Crocker mark connotes
old-fashioned wholesomeness. Such cultural meaning may exist as a result
of markholders’ attempts to build brand identity (as with many luxury
brands) or despite it (as may be argued for the image of Mattel’s Barbie as
superficial or brainless).
Because of the expressive power of brand identity and the cultural
markers that attach to marks, they are valuable communicative tools in
entertainment. For example, they may be used for purposes of
characterization and location identification. A mark can serve as shorthand
for all of its cultural implications. If, in the context of an entertainment
product, we see one person drinking San Pellegrino water and another
drinking Arrowhead water, we instantly know something about these two
individuals and how they may differ from each other.63 A shopping mall
anchored by a Sears and a Target comes across as a very different place
from one anchored by a Macy’s and a Lord & Taylor. And a parking lot
populated by BMWs and Mercedes is likely to sit outside a very different
location from one populated by Hondas and Fords—or, for that matter, one
populated by Ferraris and Lamborghinis. This sort of characterization
works on an immediate, largely unconscious level. For example, the viewer
gains an instant understanding of the penurious heroine in Pretty in Pink
and the wealthy cad she loves just by seeing her beat-up-but-quirky VW
Karmann Ghia and his new BMW.64
59. Tim Stack, Boy Brands, ENT. WKLY., July 22, 2005, at 18 (noting Entourage show creator
Doug Ellin describes his use of real brands on the show: “I pick stuff that I use or people in the
world use. We try to make it realistic.”).
60. Robert Simonson, Sixties Accuracy in Every Sip, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2009, at D4,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/dining/12don.html?_r=2&hpw.
61. The Hills, (MTV 2006). Indeed, the use of real brands and locations tends to reinforce the
semi-scripted show’s status as “reality” television.
62. SUPER SIZE ME (The Con 2004).
63. The characters in Robert Altman’s The Player (Avenue Pictures Productions, 1992)
ordered different brands of bottled water at various times in the movie, in a subtle application of
this technique.
64. PRETTY IN PINK (Paramount Pictures, 1986); see Denise E. DeLorme & Leonard N. Reid,
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2. Product Placement
Marks may also be included in entertainment as the result of a product
placement arrangement. Product placement (sometimes referred to as
“embedded marketing”) occurs when a specific product or brand is
incorporated into entertainment in exchange for some sort of compensation
by the markholder.65 Sometimes this compensation is in the form of free
goods for use in the production; frequently, however, the compensation
involves cash payment, free advertising, or some combination of all
three.66 Product placement may range from the display of a product or its
mark as part of a background tableau to the use of a product or service by a
character, to increasingly popular practices known as “product integration”
or “brand integration,” which are defined as the “seamless weaving of a
manufactured product [or service] into the storyline of an entertainment
production.”67
Product placement and brand integration are on the rise, but they are not
new. They appeared in pre-Civil War songs and in Charles Dickens’
Pickwick Papers.68 The first reported on-screen product placement
occurred shortly after the invention of the movie, when in 1896 the
Lumiere brothers filmed women washing clothes with Lever Brothers’
Sunlight Soap placed in a prominent position. The film was given the
English title Washing Day in Switzerland and Lever Brothers provided
Swiss film distribution in exchange for the favorable treatment.69 In the
decades that followed, markholders frequently provided free goods to film
producers in exchange for screen time and reciprocal advertising benefits,
and sponsored radio and television shows, which created branded
entertainment such as soap operas.70 The practice of paid product
placement—that is, the inclusion of a brand or product in exchange for a
fee—took off in the 1950s, following its use in the 1949 Marx brothers’
Moviegoers’ Experiences and Interpretations of Brands in Films Revisited, XXVII JOURNAL OF
ADVERTISING 2, at 71, 79 (Summer 1999) (“To moviegoers in both studies, regardless of age and
moviegoing frequency, brand placement was significant in that it provided relevant information
about the character’s personality, lifestyle, and role in the movie plot.”).
65. Savare, supra note 7, at 333.
66. Savare, supra note 7, at 333.
67. Product Integrators, Inc., Interactive Product Placement, Slide Presentation,
http://www.productintegrators.com/pres1/slide1.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
68. Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon & Susan Chang, The Hidden History of Product
Placement, J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA (2006), available at
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/162470371_1.html (detailing the history of paid
product placement, including paid placements in art and fiction in the Eighteenth Century).
69. Id.
70. Id. These practices have continued. In 1998, it was estimated that 90% or more of product
placements are done on a barter basis, where the product or service is simply traded for exposure in
the program. James A. Karrh, Kathy Brittain McKee & Carol J. Pardun, Practitioners’ Evolving
Views on Product Placement Effectiveness, 43 J. ADVERTISING RES. 138, 139 (2003).
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film Love Happy.71 Since the paid placement dam burst in the 1950s, the
practice has risen in popularity from a practice that few had ever noticed or
heard of to one that is nearly ubiquitous. Its popularity has especially
ballooned since the appearance of Reese’s Pieces in the film E.T., The
Extra-Terrestrial (and associated synergistic marketing) was famously
reputed to temporarily triple sales of the candy.72 Since then, the list of
prominent product placements and the types of entertainment in which they
appear has grown to a degree that it would be impossible to list them all:
BMWs and Aston Martins in James Bond films;73 Coca-Cola products on
American Idol;74 Bulgari jewelry in the book The Bulgari Connection;75
Seagram’s Gin in hip-hop music;76 and Burger King in Electronic Arts’
video game Fight Night Round 3.77 The product placement industry
71. Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon & Susan Chang, The Hidden History of Product
Placement, J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA (2006), available at
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/162470371_1.html. In a climactic sequence,
Harpo Marx escapes with stolen diamonds by running past a number of neon billboards including
one for Baby Ruth candy and one for Fisk tires; riding the Mobil Oil “Pegasus” mascot; and
swinging from a gigantic Bulova clock pendulum into the mouth of a smoking Kool penguin. Id.
Signage rights were sold in advance to various entities including Socony for $25,000, Curtiss Baby
Ruth for $25,000, and Bulova Watches for $4,500 plus $150,000 in advertising. Id. Fisk tires paid
$2,000 for its momentary appearance. Id.
72. Id.
73. Product Integration is as Old as Hollywood Itself, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Apr. 28,
2005, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content
_id=1000901394.
74. Nate Anderson, Product Placement Still Huge as Advertisers Fight DVRs, ARS TECHNICA,
Sept. 17, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080917-product-placement-still-huge-asadvertisers-fight-dvrs.html (noting that from January through June, 2008, American Idol featured
4,636 placements, most of them for Coca-Cola, which was the most-placed product during the first
half of 2008); see also Michael A. Wiles & Anna Danielova, The Worth of Product Placement in
Successful Films: An Event Study Analysis, 73 J. MARKETING 44, 54 (July 2009) (referencing chart
containing a relatively small but still impressive list of product placements in major release feature
films).
75. FAY WELDON, THE BULGARI CONNECTION 14 (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000). Another
example is Timex, which was approached with a deal to weave its products into the plot of a Tom
Clancy book, movie, CD-ROM, and Internet game for $1.3 million. Michelle R. Nelson, Recall of
Brand Placements in Computer/Video Games, 42 J. ADVERTISING RES. 80, 81 (2002).
76. For example, Petey Pablo’s Freek-a-leek, which reached number 2 on the Billboard Rap
Charts, included the lyrics: “Now I got to give a shout out to Seagram’s Gin/Cause I’m drinkin’ it
and they payin’ me for it.” See Krissah Williams, In Hip-Hop, Making Name-Dropping Pay, WASH.
POST, Aug. 29, 2005, at D1.
77. Mike Musgrove, Advertisers Are Getting Into the Game, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at
D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/01/AR20060
30102285.html. “Nielsen Entertainment, the television tracking firm,” estimates that video game
product placement and in-game advertisement would “grow to [be a] $1 billion [business] by
2010.” Id.; see also Michelle R. Nelson, Heejo Keum & Ronald A. Yaros, Advertainment or
Adcreep? Game Players’ Attitudes toward Advertising and Product Placements in Computer
Games, 5 J. INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING (2004), available at http://www.jiad.org/article52
(discussing various product placements in video games); Nelson, supra note 75, at 83–84 (including
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continues to grow, as well.78 Encouraged by marketing agencies, the
popularity of product placement has grown more quickly in recent years.
From April 2005 to December 2007 alone, instances of product placement
in television grew by 40%.79 Industry experts predict that product
placement expenditures will increase at a compounded rate of about 15%
per annum through 2009 and that product placement will be a $7.55 billion
market by 2010.80 Indeed, in the current production climate, it is
exceedingly rare—approaching nonexistent—for a nationally released
feature film or television show not to feature any product placement.81
This growth in popularity can be attributed to a number of factors. For
one thing, product placement is good for markholders. Consumer behavior
can be tracked directly to entertainment content, including product
placement. In addition to the boost Reese’s Pieces received from its
appearance in E.T., sales of undershirts are estimated to have dropped 40%
after Clark Gable unbuttoned his shirt to reveal a bare chest in the film It
Happened One Night,82 and sales of Pinot Noir (of all brands) increased
over 22% after the wine variety was praised in the film Sideways.83 Study
participants who viewed the movie Wayne’s World in its entirety reported a
purchase intention for placed brands that was 16% higher than for brands
they had previously identified as “favorites.”84 Further, product placement
chart identifying examples and types of product placements in video games).
78. The dozens of firms who specialize in facilitating product placement and other forms of
“branded entertainment” have their own trade association, the Association of Entertainment
Marketing Professionals, which describes itself as “the entertainment industry’s association for
product placement agencies whose members represent corporations for the express purpose of
handling branded integration, product placement and promotions for feature films, television and
music videos.” Entertainment Resources & Marketing Association (ERMA), ERMA Bylaws,
http://www.emainc.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=4&id=
46&Itemid=47 (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). ERMA member information is available at ERMA’s
website. See ERMA, http://www.emainc.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
79. Kenneth C. Wilbur et al., Effects of Advertising and Product Placement on Television
Audiences 1–2 (USC Marshall School of Business Marshall Research Paper Series, Working Paper
MKT 09-09, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1151507.
80. Kai Falkenberg & Elizabeth McNamara, Using Trademarked Products In Entertainment
Programming, 24 A.B.A. COMM. LAW. 1, 1 n.2, 13 (2007) (citing the PQ Media Global Product
Placement Forecast 2006-2010); Steven N. Lewis, Branded Entertainment and Product
Integration: A Revolution in its Infancy, 23 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 11 (2006) (citing to the PQ Media
LLC projected product placement forecast for 2006–2010).
81. See generally WRITERS’ GUILD OF AM., “ARE YOU SELLING TO ME?” STEALTH
ADVERTISING IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY (2005), available at http://www.wga.org/uploaded
Files/news_and_events/press_release/2005/white_paper.pdf (discussing proliferation of product
integration in feature films and television shows).
82. IT HAPPENED ONE NIGHT (Columbia Pictures Corporation 1934).
83. SIDEWAYS (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2004); Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80,
at 1.
84. Siva K. Balasubramanian, James A. Karrh & Hemant Patwardhan, Audience Response to
Product Placements: An Integrative Framework and Future Research Agenda, 35 J. ADVERTISING
115, 133 (2006).
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is generally less expensive for markholders than traditional advertising,85
and in many cases is more likely to reach viewers, as more traditional
methods of advertising have become more expensive and less effective.
Audiences have fragmented into a wide range of entertainment sources,
including cable television, the Internet, and mobile content, while
technology and market saturation have inured consumers to more
traditional advertising techniques. Moreover, advertising in nearly every
marketing channel has become more expensive, and competition has
tightened.86 Specifically, in the television context, consumers’ ability to
skip commercials using VCRs and (especially) DVRs has eroded consumer
advertising attention. These factors have combined to inspire an increasing
number of advertisers to explore product placement as an avenue for
connecting with consumers.87
At the same time, rising production costs have made product placement
more appealing to content creators of all types and sizes.88 For small or
independent producers, product placements may be difficult to secure
(because such productions may not be able to promise large audiences)—
but even so, a paid placement can make the difference between making a
work and not being able to afford it.89 For large-scale productions, the
sums paid for conspicuous placement of a product may be at least as
influential—and they are rising. As recently as 1990, the Walt Disney
Company priced a product placement episode with visual, visual + brandname mention, and actual product use content at $20,000, $40,000, and
$60,000, respectively.90 In 2002, a single placement of a detergent on a
sitcom could yield from nearly $23,000 (the sum paid for a seven-second
close up of Sunlight brand detergent on the sitcom Everybody Loves
Raymond) to over $225,000 (for a character’s use of Snuggle detergent on
Friends).91 From 2004 to 2005, companies including Burger King, Dove
Body Wash, Sony PlayStation, Verizon Wireless, and Visa each paid an
estimated $2 million to $2.5 million to be incorporated into the plot lines
of The Apprentice.92 More recent studies suggest that the practice could
85. Savare, supra note 7, at 356–57.
86. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 13.
87. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 13; Savare, supra note 7, at 332–33.
88. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 7.
89. Savare, supra note 7, at 359 (noting markholders and their agents consider distribution
prospects in determining whether and on what terms to place a product); id. at 371 n.270
(“[P]roduct placement agencies generally do not pay much attention to films that they deem do not
have a viable chance of being distributed. . . . [These agencies] ‘are unwilling to support chancier
projects that are in far greater need of support.’”) (internal citations omitted).
90. Balasubramanian et al., supra note 84, at 134.
91. Louis Chunovic, Trying To Price Placement: Kraft, Unilever View ITVX Service that
Claims to Put Value on Product Appearances, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 2, 2002, at 4. Information
on placement pricing is scant, as producers and networks generally do not release the terms of such
arrangements. Wilbur et al., supra note 79, at 13.
92. Stuart Elliott, Burger King Moves Quickly to Take a Product from TV to the Table, N.Y.
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reduce the feature film industry’s production costs by 25%.93 Thus, product
placement is symbiotic, giving markholders a relatively inexpensive way of
disseminating advertising to a large viewing audience, while providing
content creators with an additional source of funding.94
Also notable is the degree to which the consuming public has become
aware of the practice of product placement. The practice is so ubiquitous
that consumers have come to expect that blockbuster movies will contain
product placements. They are accustomed to gratuitous and lingering shots
of James Bond’s cell phone with the “Ericsson” logo clearly visible, and by
the startup screen of a computer on Fox’s 24 showing nothing but the logo
for Cisco Systems. Consumers cannot help but know that they are on the
receiving end of product placement; the signals are all around them. Even
if consumers would not naturally assume that the products they see in
entertainment are placed, the press and popular culture tell them so.95
Indeed, more than ten thousand news articles have been published
regarding product placement in the last three years.96 Of the 651 articles on
product placement that have appeared in the New York Times since 1981,
more than half were printed within the last five years.97 The press has also
perpetuated an overly-expansive view of trademark law’s reach. For
example, an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education warned that
“[f]leeting references to actual institutions should qualify as ‘fair use’
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/21/business/media/
21adco.html.
93. Kim Bartel Sheehan & Aibing Guo, “Leaving on a (Branded) Jet Plane”: An Exploration
of Audience Attitudes Towards Product Assimilation in Television Content, 27 J. CURRENT ISSUES &
RES. ADVERTISING 79, 80 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
94. Savare, supra note 7, at 356–57 (discussing symbiotic benefits of product placement to
markholders and content creators). Savare notes that some also credit product placement with
adding to verisimilitude in entertainment, while others point out that most product placements are
gratuitous and exist for purely economic reasons. Id. at 357–58.
95. For example, Antrepo Design Industry, a graphic design firm based in Turkey, has gained
attention in the United States through its blog. See ANTREPO4, A2591, http://a2591.blogspot.com/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2009). The firm’s output includes a set of movie posters that contain nothing
but the name of the film and the brands featured in the film. Id. (follow hyperlink “Type PS
(Posters)” under “Container Type”). Posters include Iron Man, The Matrix Trilogy, The Bourne
Ultimatum, Kill Bill Vol. 1, Ocean’s Eleven, and The Dark Knight. Id. Interestingly, while Antrepo
has named the poster set “Movie Posters With Brand Integration,” the posters list (nearly) all brands
(including University of California and Yale University) that appear in the films without regard for
whether the uses were placed, authorized, or used without authorization. See ANTREPO4, A2591,
Movie Posters with Brand Integration, http://a2591.blogspot.com/2008/09/movie-posters-withbrand-integration.html (Oct. 9, 2008).
96. This information is based on a search in Westlaw’s ALLNEWS database for (“product
placement” or “product integration” or “brand integration”).
97. This information is based upon a search in Westlaw’s NYT database conducted on July
16, 2009 for (“product placement” or “product integration” or “brand integration”). This search
resulted in 707 articles, all dated 1981 or later. Id. The most recent 383 of these were dated
November 2003 or later. Id.
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under trademark law, but anything more persistent requires permission,”98
and the Wall Street Journal told its online readers that “[f]ilmmakers must
sidestep delicate trademark issues when setting a scene. Prominently
showing an AOL email screen or Google search page, for example,
requires approval from the companies, so some production designers create
a variation that avoids the red tape.”99
In addition, many entertainment products themselves have lampooned
the practice, bringing it to the forefront of public attention. To name just a
few: the film Wayne’s World featured a section devoted to product
placement, in which lead characters Wayne and Garth discussed the moral
implications of “selling out” while successively presenting to the camera
products from Pizza Hut, Doritos, Reebok, Nuprin, and Pepsi, eventually
weaving the products’ mottos in to their dialogue;100 the film Josie and the
Pussycats blatantly positioned product logos for laughs, like a 6-foot long
“Advil” logo plastered on the floor below an overhead shot of two young
women having a fist fight;101 and the characters in the television show 30
Rock looked into the camera to ask, after singing the praises of Verizon
phones, “can we have our money now?”102
The more consumers are aware of the prevalence of product placement,
the more likely they are to believe that all marks appearing in
entertainment are placed or licensed.103 As Mark McKenna wrote, “If the
start time of a baseball game indicates 7-Eleven’s sponsorship [as it has for
the Chicago White Sox since 2007], is it really possible to say definitively
that consumers would conclude that the presence of ‘Microsoft’ in the title
of an article does not?”104 This belief is bolstered by the practice,
98. Sara Lipka, PG-13? Not This College. Or That One. Or…, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
June 18, 2009, at A1, A21, available at http://beta.chronicle.com/article/PG-13-Not-This-CollegeOr/44494/.
99. Andrew Lavallee, Hollywood’s Take on the Internet Often Favors Fun Over Facts, WALL
ST. J. ONLINE, May 1, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB114417762246516812JafduzlqqrJNqD9QzSSA0d3LIk8_20060508.html?mod=blogs.
100. WAYNE’S WORLD (Paramount Pictures 1992).
101. JOSIE AND THE PUSSYCATS (Universal Pictures, 2001).
102. Gail Schiller, “30 Rock” Rolls Ads Into Story Lines, REUTERS, Nov. 28, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/entertainmentNews/idUSN2833828120071128.
103. For example, press and consumers alike have expressed confusion over whether the show
Entourage has received promotional consideration for the many realism-enhancing products used
on the show. Entertainment Weekly confirmed that the show receives no payment for its use of
brands, yet the blog Product Placement Watch continues to believe, years later, that the products
appearing in the show are paid placements. See Stack, supra note 59, at 18 (Entourage’s love of
brand names smells fishy. Show creator Doug Ellin says he gets no money for his prominent
placements of Apple, Barney’s, and Van Cleef & Arpels . . . but “we’ll really get suspicious if
Vince
starts
doing
iPod
commercials.”);
Product
Placement
Watch,
http://productplacementwatch.blogspot.com/2007/04/entourage-promoting-brands-in-fake-real.html
(Apr. 9, 2007).
104. Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773,
823 (2009).
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especially common in music videos, of digitally pixellating or otherwise
obscuring marks that are not licensed or placed.105 This pixellation or
blurring of marks typically occurs when the appearance of the mark does
not bear on the subject matter of the video. For example, apparel logos are
frequently blurred in rap videos, but logos designed to make a statement,
such as the use of a Louis Vuitton logo to indicate luxury in Britney
Spears’ video for the song Do Somethin’,106 are left in.107 By drawing
attention to obscured marks, the practice of blurring unlicensed marks
sends a message to consumers that gratuitous appearances of marks need to
be licensed.108
Not only are consumers barraged with evidence of product placement,
but research also shows that they have come to expect it. In 2005, some
43% of consumers already believed that the primary purpose of a scene in
a television show featuring someone using a product was an attempt to
influence purchase,109 and 65% of magazine readers believed that editorial
mentions of a brand are the result of a deal between the mark owner and
the magazine.110 A growing body of marketing and social science literature
indicates that consumers are aware of, and influenced by, product
placement.111
105. Gibson, supra note 5, at 919 (For example, MTV’s long-form programming policy
requires blurring of any prominently featured brand that is not part of a product placement deal).
This practice is motivated in part by a desire to avoid trademark law entanglements, and in part by a
desire not to provide free advertising to companies that might otherwise pay for placement.
Interview with John Rogers, creator and executive producer of Leverage (TNT); Interview with
Alexander Court, assistant to the producer of Greek (ABC Family). Regardless of the reason, the
practice tends to reinforce consumer assumptions that any brand appearing in entertainment is
sponsored or approved by the markholder.
106. BRITNEY SPEARS, DO SOMETHIN’ (Jive 2005).
107. See Amy Odell, Sony To Pay Louis Vuitton for Past Britney, Da Brat Videos, N.Y. MAG.,
Aug. 1, 2008 (discussing settlement of European suit concerning use of Louis Vuitton logo on
dashboard of fantasy Humvee in Britney Spears’ Do Somethin’ video).
108. Gibson, supra note 5, at 917–18 (citing social science research that indicates a strong
tendency to draw causal inferences from information to which one’s attention is drawn); Newman,
supra note 6, at 359.
109. Dawn Anfuso, Survey Says: TV Ads Not Dead, IMEDIA CONNECTION, Aug. 22, 2005,
http://www.imediaconnection.com/news/6577.asp (emphasis added).
110. The Week, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 17, 2005, at 20.
111. DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 72, 85; see also id. at 78 (observing that moviegoers
in the study “were aware of the persuasive intent of brand props”); id. at 85 (“Our results
convincingly demonstrate that moviegoers are more sophisticated in their understanding of the
practice of brand placement than critics would have public policy officials believe.”); Yongjun
Sung, Federico de Gregorio & Jong-Hyuok Jung, Non-Student Consumer Attitudes Towards
Product Placement: Implications for Public Policy and Advertisers, 28(2) INT’L J. ADVERTISING
277 (2009) (discussing study showing that “consumers are very much aware that brands within
movies are often a form of commercial persuasion, do not see harm in its results, and find benefit in
the practice’s enhancement of the fictionalized worlds within those films.”); Gibson, supra note 5,
at 918–19. See generally Sharmistha Law & Kathryn A. Braun-LaTour, Product Placements: How
to Measure their Impact, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES
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3. Permission For Use of Marks
While some marks that appear in entertainment are placed there in
exchange for “promotional consideration”—money or goods provided by
markholders to content creators in exchange for favorable depictions—
other uses involve payment by content creators to markholders in exchange
for permission to use the marks in the content. Although one involves
payment by a markholder and the other involves payment to a markholder,
both product placement and licensing result in a markholder’s exercise of
control over the use of its mark. Still other uses are unauthorized.112 In
theory, using a mark without authorization would result in greater artistic
freedom for a content creator; in practice, however, all content creators
must be concerned with the repercussions of any trademark uses, and those
who prefer to use marks without authorization may find themselves
cramping their own creativity in order to avoid lawsuits.
To the extent that recent cases involving unauthorized uses of marks
have reached the courts, most have resulted in findings of noninfringement.113 Yet, these results have not deterred markholders from
seeking to restrict artistic uses of their marks. For example, although courts
have repeatedly stated that “the ‘mere appearance’ of a Ford Taurus in a
generic film scene involving a car chase would not, by itself, support a
trademark infringement claim,”114 the producers of the 2008 Knight Rider
television show have received numerous cease and desist letters from car
BETWEEN ENTERTAINMENT AND PERSUASION 63 (L.J. Shrum ed., 2004) (discussing models and
studies of consumer persuasion by product placements). Cf. Paul Siegel, Product Placement and the
Law, HANDBOOK OF PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN THE MASS MEDIA 89, 97 (Mary-Lou Galician ed.,
2004) (noting that product placements may have been clandestine fifteen years ago but that
“nowadays, audiences are keenly aware of their existence”).
112. Although, as discussed below, the norm trends toward receiving authorization for the use
of marks as required by most insurance companies, some content creators still use marks without
authorization. See Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1258 (N.D.
Cal. 2003) (noting Defendants filed a declaration stating that as a matter of custom, they do not seek
the permission of manufacturers of name-brand products to use those products in its films, and thus
did not license the Wham-O “Slip ‘N Slide” nor the other marks used in the film Dickie Roberts:
Former Child Star (including Wesson Oil, Volkswagen, and Ford)).
113. See, e.g., id. at 1262–63 (finding no infringement for use of “Slip ‘N Slide” toy in plot of
film Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913,
919–20 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (finding no infringement for prominent use of Caterpillar mark on
bulldozers in climactic destruction scene of George of the Jungle 2); Gottlieb Dev. LLC v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that use of pinball
machine in background of film What Women Want was not trademark infringement); see also Rock
& Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that artist’s use of building image in photograph did not constitute trademark infringement,
but basing decision on determination that building image did not constitute a protectable trademark.
This holding supports a claim for infringement when a protectable mark is used in same
circumstances); McGeveran, supra note 11, at 59 (discussing how “correct outcomes” of recent
cases have not diminished the continued chilling effect of trademark law on expression).
114. Gottlieb, 590 F. Supp. at 635.
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companies for using their cars in chase scenes against the show’s mythical
(Ford) car, KITT.115 Cease and desist letters in this context are difficult to
track, but there can be no doubt that they are both common and chilling.116
Even a content creator who is likely to prevail in a trademark
infringement suit has much to fear from litigation. Litigation is costly, and
even cases that settle prior to adjudication involve significant expense.117
Moreover, litigation of trademark disputes is frequently fact-intensive and
involves the additional expense of retaining survey experts to explore
whether the unauthorized use of a mark caused confusion as to sponsorship
or endorsement, or whether the unauthorized use is supported by a First
Amendment defense.118 Survey results and other questions of fact may
preclude motions to dismiss, or even summary judgment, requiring
lengthier litigation and increased discovery costs.119 Furthermore, the
remedy for trademark infringement typically includes injunctive relief, and
both preliminary and permanent injunctions are common. While injunctive
relief is an eminently appropriate penalty from a trademark standpoint—
once a use is found to infringe, permitting that use to continue would not
only perpetuate the harm of infringement but also weaken the plaintiff’s
mark—content creators may (reasonably) perceive the unauthorized use of
marks as “not worth the risk.”120
115. Gary Scott Thompson, Executive Producer, Knight Rider, Remarks at the Paley Center
For Media Panel on Branded Entertainment (Oct. 8, 2008), available at
http://www.paleycenter.org/mc-breakfast-panel-branded-entertainment (“We’ve had cease and
desists from numerous automotive [companies] because they say that that Ford [KITT] could never
beat our car in a race . . . It was, seriously, it came from a lawyer. Our car can beat your car so you
can’t use it.”) [hereinafter Thompson Remarks].
116. The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse database does not track cease and desist letters in this
particular context, but it is clear from news reports that they occur frequently. Chilling Effects,
http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). As just one example among many: in
July 2009, The University of Utah sent a cease and desist letter to the television show Big Love after
the show included a three-second shot of a document with the school name and “Big U” logo. Brian
Maffly & Vince Horiuchi, U. to HBO: Take Our Logo out of ‘Big Love’ Episode, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
July 8, 2009, available at http://www.sltrib.com/tv/ci_12768989. Cease and desist letters may not
cost the accused infringer as much as a lawsuit does, but they can have a similarly chilling effect on
conduct, especially since they are easier and cheaper for markholders to send, with fewer
repercussions. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 585, 589–90 (2008) (discussing chilling effect of cease and desist letters even when a
case has no merit).
117. See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 62–63 (discussing high cost of trademark litigation).
118. See, e.g., Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (supporting First
Amendment defense); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000,
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Mattel II, 28 F. Supp.
2d 1120, 1132–33 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
119. See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 813–14 (discussing parties’ extensive discovery
disputes).
120. Gibson, supra note 5, at 913. Injunctive relief is considered necessary to trademark law
for the same reason that markholders are required to police their marks (or face losing their marks as
a consequence of failure to police): an infringing mark confuses consumers and weakens the
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It is natural, then, that content creators and their insurance companies,
unsure when they can use marks and when they can’t, would choose to
license marks even when licensing is not necessary or to forego the use of
marks entirely. A culture of “license, don’t litigate” has arisen in the
entertainment industry.121 Several commentators have dubbed this
litigation-avoidance approach the “clearance culture.”122 In an abundance
of caution, content creators will acquire permission for all uses of
trademarks (and all uses of copyrighted material), even when there are
strong defenses to infringement or when the uses are not likely to confuse
or dilute the value of the mark. Creators and insurers would rather pay to
use a mark, or avoid its use altogether, than argue that the use is permitted
without authorization.123
Lawyers and commentators commonly counsel content creators to
remove any unauthorized marks, products, or services from their creative
works.124 This can create significant expense and delay. For example,
production on a major reality show was delayed when lawyers advised that
the plan to film at a Target department store required permission not only
from Target (which had been obtained), but also from the owners of every
mark that would appear on shelves in the background.125 Even more
importantly, insurance companies often require that all trademark uses be
accounted for, either by product placement or licensing.126 For example,
insurance carriers commonly require television shows to create episode-byepisode “clearance reports” detailing what marks are used and stating
which uses are licensed and which are placed.127 Marks that are not cleared
original mark.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 10, at 22. Aufderheide and Jaszi define the
clearance culture as “the shared set of expectations that all rights must always be cleared.” Id.
123. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 10, at 22–23; Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable
Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1912 (2007) (discussing the
pervasiveness of clearance culture and its effects on creative products such as biographies and
documentaries).
124. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 19 (“All of this should caution producers to
think seriously before using branded products in entertainment programming without permission.”);
Ronald H. Gertz et al., Clearance of Rights for Motion Picture and Television Productions,
CENTURY CITY BAR ASS’N J., Summer 1983, at 42, 43, 47–50 (recommending clearance of all
“identifiable names, products, locations, companies [etc.]”).
125. Interview with Deborah Henderson, Associate, Irell & Manella LLP, in L.A., Cal. (Oct.
2008).
126. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 12, at 5 (stating errors and omissions insurance carriers
demand “permission for every snippet of film, photographs, music, or text that is used, in addition
to shots of distinctive buildings or products,” even when no cause of action would exist).
127. Interview with Alexander Court, Assistant to the Producer of Greek, ABC Family, in
L.A., Cal. (Oct. 2008). These reports are also used by the networks’ advertising sales departments to
identify markholders who might be amenable to paid product placement deals, and to limit the use
of non-placed marks. Id.
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must be removed before an episode airs.128 Content creators comply with
insurers’ demands out of expediency and fear.129 In addition to the
clearance of all copyrighted works and the clearance or removal of all
proper names, most television and film studios’ “standards and practices”
require the elimination of any references to trademarks in dialogue and the
removal of or blurring of trademarks that appear on screen.130 Such
restrictions not only add expense, but may also silence creation altogether.
For example, the Sony Pictures film Moneyball (which was slated to be
directed by Stephen Soderbergh and star Brad Pitt) was scrapped in its
entirety shortly before filming was scheduled to begin, largely because the
demands of markholder Major League Baseball forced Sony and
Soderbergh to make unacceptable compromises in the film’s expression.131
128. Id.; see also Thompson Remarks, supra note 115 (“We use products every day, so for us
on a show, we’re constantly finding storylines where we actually want to use a product and we
can’t, because there’s no deal in place.”).
129. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 10, at 23 (reporting documentary filmmaker Robert
Stone’s concern that “[i]f you ever have a claim on E&O insurance . . . you might as well go into
another line of work. You can never file a claim or you get blacklisted—and never be insured
again.”).
130. See Rothman, supra note 123, at 1922; see also, e.g., MTV Tr3s, Terms and Conditions
of
Participation
in
the
“MTV
Tr3s
Rock
Dinner”
Casting
Call,
http://www.mtvtr3s.com/asm/sweeps/rules/rockdinner_castingcallrules_BALA_021309.doc at ¶4
(last visited Oct. 10, 2009) (barring submissions from containing anything violative of MTV
Standards and Practices, including “[c]ommercial products (e.g., clothing, toys, food) and/or their
trademarks, brands, logos or endorsements [and] Unauthorized trademark and copyrighted
materials”); Comedy Central, Important Things with Demetri Martin: Picture Contest Official
Rules, http://www.comedycentral.com/shows/important_things/contest_rules/index.jhtml at ¶ 3 (last
visited Oct. 10, 2009) (barring submissions from containing anything violative of MTV standards
and practices, including “any commercial endorsements [and] . . . any unauthorized use of a service
mark, trademark, brand, copyrighted work or any other property, tangible or intangible, or location
or place or that would otherwise not be considered your original work”). This is likely the origin of
scenes like the one in an episode of The Office (Reveille Productions 2008), in which the characters
sat in front of a break-room vending machine with all of its contents flipped around so that only the
backs of packaging were visible.
131. Michael Cieply, Despite A-List Star and Director, a Prestige Film Falls Through, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/business/media/02
moneyball.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=moneyball&st=cse. In his discussion of the Moneyball
controversy, William McGeveran succinctly summed up the harm of permitting this level of
markholder control:
So, if a screenwriter wants to tell a story about a real team, baseball’s PR
executives must approve of it first? To the degree that they can change the
entire style of the movie? What if the character makes a pact with Satan to
defeat the Yankees? [Damn Yankees] How about an acclaimed Lou Gehrig
biopic [The Pride of the Yankees], or a cartoon about Babe Ruth’s talking bat
[Everyone’s Hero]? What about a mock trial of Pete Rose at Harvard Law
School?
William McGeveran, Trademarks, Movies, and the Clearance Culture, July 2, 2009,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2009/07/02/tm-movie-clearance/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss5/6

28

Rosenblatt: Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment

2009]

RETHINKING THE PARAMETERS OF TRADEMARK USE IN ENTERTAINMENT

1039

Creators in all media have faced trademark-based restrictions. For
example, Jennifer Rothman describes the creative choices imposed on
author Don DeLillo, whose publisher demanded that he change the name
of his book Panasonic (a reference to consumer culture as well as an
expression of the cacophonous world inhabited by the book’s protagonist),
and the makers of the film Camp Out (a documentary about a summer
camp for gay teens), who were required by studio lawyers to clear the
trademark rights for every piece of Elvis Presley memorabilia contained in
the dormitory room of an Elvis-obsessed camper.132 DeLillo and the
makers of Camp Out would likely have had solid defenses in any suits
concerning their uses of marks, but as a practical matter, even content
creators who would prevail in a trademark suit have little choice but to
license marks or refrain from using them altogether.
These situations reflect the way in which existing trademark law causes
content creators to choose between compromising their expression and
facing increased costs. Creators without the budgets to pay for each
product and service that appears in a work will be forced to compromise
their expression. Moreover, existing trademark law imposes creativity
constraints even on those creators who can afford to clear all marks
because licensing or placing a mark requires some relinquishing of creative
control, and some licensing requests are certain to be refused. This is
particularly likely to occur in the case of parodies or other uses that may
involve an unfavorable depiction of the mark, product, or service.133 But
“unfavorable” is in the eye of the beholder, and markholder demands may
range from inconsequential changes to seeking wholesale revision—
making it impossible for content creators to use real marks in their works
without adding a layer of (at best, unpredictable, and at worst, crippling)
censorship. For example, New York University balked at “racy” story lines
in the television show Felicity,134 forcing its producers to create a fictional
university for its students (thereby sacrificing realism).135 Whether caused
by risk aversion, insurance requirements, or markholder demands (or a
combination of the three), the result is a broad limitation on the storytelling
132. See Rothman, supra note 123, at 1903, 1914.
133. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 12, at 21. Documentary filmmakers report trademark
difficulty in depicting real world, and creative choices dictated by trademark concerns. See id. at
20–21. For example, one participant commented:
They’re everywhere. I cut a scene from a film because there was a big cup with
this gas station trademark on it, but the problem is, you can’t go into a store,
you can’t buy anything that doesn’t have a logo on it. So they don’t give you
the option of having a cup with no logo, but I was like, “oh god, I didn’t realize
that cup had this huge logo in the side of the frame.”
Id. In this situation, the filmmaker cut the scene, in part because it involved addiction, a subject
with which the filmmaker feared the markholder would not want to be associated. Id. at 21.
Similarly, Panasonic denied DeLillo’s request to clear the book title, and the Presley estate could
easily have refused to license its marks for use in the film Camp Out in light of the film’s
controversial subject (or for no reason at all). See Rothman, supra note 123, at 1914.
134. Felicity (Touchstone Television 1998).
135. Lipka, supra note 98, at A1.
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and artistic tools available to content creators. James Gibson refers to this
as the “anticommons”—a subset of potential sources of creative content
that the law takes out of the public vocabulary.136
C. Harmful Results
Product placement and the culture of “license, don’t litigate” combine
to create a recursive problem.137 As more marks are placed or licensed and
fewer marks are used without authorization in favor of conspicuous
blurring or generic designations, consumers perceive that all uses of marks
are “bought or paid for.”138 Because the question of trademark
infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act hinges on consumer
confusion, this perception essentially creates infringement where none
existed—to the extent that consumers believe that all uses of marks must
be authorized by the markholder, any unauthorized use is confusing and
therefore infringing. This, in turn, increases the need for content creators to
avoid using unlicensed marks, and hence, the pattern continues.139
This recursive expansion of trademark rights, which James Gibson dubs
“rights accretion,” is not a hypothetical problem.140 Although suits
regarding the use of trademarks in expressive works are not a new
phenomenon,141 recent years have shown a marked increase in litigation
over unauthorized uses of marks in entertainment. The Rock and Roll Hall
of Fame sued photographer Chuck Gentile for including an image of the
building in a poster.142 Wham-O sued Paramount Pictures for the use of its
“Slip ‘N Slide” toy in the film Dickie Roberts: Child Star.143 Caterpillar
sued Walt Disney Company for the use of its mark on bulldozers in the

136. Gibson, supra note 5, at 933.
137. Gibson, supra note 5, at 913, 934. Gibson discusses this recursive problem as one
instance of “rights accretion” in U.S. intellectual property law. Id. at 907–28.
138. See Anfuso, supra note 109 (reporting 43% of television viewers believe that the primary
purpose of product appearances in television shows is an attempt to influence purchasing); The
Week: Mag Readers Assume Advertisers Pay for Plugs, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 17, 2005, at 20
(reporting 65% of magazine readers believe that product appearances in magazines are placed); cf.
Gibson, supra note 5, at 924 (“In one 1983 poll, 91.2% of respondents agreed that ‘[n]o product
can bear the name of an entertainer, cartoon character, or some other famous person unless
permission is given for its use by the owner of the name or character . . . .’”).
139. Gibson, supra note 5, at 907–08; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The
Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 495–89 (2005)
(discussing effect of consumer expectations on trademark law).
140. See Gibson, supra note 5, at 885–86.
141. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202
(2d Cir. 1979).
142. Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 750–51 (6th
Cir. 1998).
143. Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1255 (N.D.Cal.
2003).
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film George of the Jungle 2.144 Emerson Electronics sued NBC for
showing its InSinkErator mark on the television show Heroes.145 Bell
Helicopter sued Electronic Arts for the use of its HUEY mark and trade
dress in the video game Battlefield Vietnam.146 The University of Alabama
sued sports artist Daniel A. Moore for using its distinctive crimson and
white color scheme in paintings depicting Alabama football games.147
Louis Vuitton sued Sony BMG in French court over the use of its mark in
music videos and album covers.148 A pinball machine company sued
Paramount Pictures for using a pinball machine with the SILVER
SLUGGER mark visible in the background of the film What Women
Want.149 The list of suits goes on and on. And although some of these cases
have ended in losses for the markholder, others remain unresolved or have
ended in monetary and/or injunctive settlements.150 The lesson is that the
unauthorized use of a mark in an expressive work is a risky endeavor.
By increasing the riskiness of unauthorized mark use, these practices
create a situation in which content creators’ only choices are to refrain
from using marks or to relinquish creative control to markholders through
licensing or placement. Regardless of content creators’ ultimate decision,
the fact of their having to choose creates a number of harmful effects. First,
it chills expressive speech by limiting the availability of marks as
expressive tools and limiting content creators’ ability to craft depictions of
the real world. Second, it conflicts with several policies underlying
trademark law, including the speech-fostering policy that trademark law
should not take words, symbols, or colors out of circulation any more than
necessary, even when leaving terms in circulation may lead to consumer
144. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 915 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
145. Complaint at 3–4, Emerson Elec. Co. v. NBC Universal Television Studios, Inc., 4:06-cv01454-TCM (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2006).
146. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Original Complaint at 5, Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v.
Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 4:06-cv-00841 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2007).
147. Adam Liptak, Sports Artist Sued for Mixing Crimson and Tide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2006, at 11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/us/12artist.html?_r=2.
148. See Odell, supra note 107 (reporting the settlement of a French suit concerning use of
Louis Vuitton logo in Britney Spears and Da Brat videos and Rueben Studdard album cover).
149. Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 630 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
150. Sony BMG agreed to cease distribution of allegedly infringing materials and pay Louis
Vuitton an undisclosed settlement amount estimated over $300,000 for the use of the LV marks in
its videos and album covers. Odell, supra note 107. Although the terms of the settlement in the Bell
Helicopter case were not released, Battlefield Vietnam no longer contains HUEY helicopters, which
have been replaced by “transport” helicopters. Moreover, a markholder loss in a product placement
case does not necessarily indicate that a future case on a similar theory would not succeed. See
Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding an artist’s use of a building image in a photograph did not constitute trademark
infringement, but basing its decision on a determination that building image did not constitute a
protectable trademark; this holding supports a claim for infringement when a protectable mark is
used in same circumstances).
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confusion.151 Third, it increases the transaction costs of content creation,
which has a disproportionately large speech-chilling effect for small and
independent content creators. While large entertainment companies, game
giants, and publishing houses may be able to incur increased production
costs with relative ease—and may be able to promise larger audiences as
an incentive for a markholder to authorize the use of a mark—small and
independent creators are less likely to have the funds or audiences required
to secure permission to use marks, and thus are more likely to face a choice
between prohibitive cost and freedom of expressive choice.
1. The Loss of Communicative Tools
The creative restrictions that arise from the “anticommons” are
significant. First, verisimilitude suffers. A content creator cannot
practically depict the real world of a given time or place without depicting
the trademarks and trade dress of that time and place. In the real world,
consumers are presented with brand names and distinctive trade dress with
nearly every glance. It is nearly impossible, for example, to present an
external view of an individual driving a car without showing the car’s
brand signifiers or distinctive trade dress. Any scene set in a kitchen will
include brand identifiers (the stove, the refrigerator, the faucets, the food
packaging, etc.) and urban street scenes are even more brand-heavy, with
stores, advertisements, and commercial goods in the frame of nearly any
realistic view, just to name a few.152 In fact, a content creator interested in
depicting the real world may have no choice but to depict the marks in it,
not only for reasons of verisimilitude, but also in order to avoid litigation.
In Sherwood 48 Associates v. Sony Corp. of America,153 the Second Circuit
implied that the digital alteration of trade dress in a film—removing marks
from the resulting expressive work—could constitute trademark
infringement, provided that the marks were part of an articulable and
distinctive trade dress.154
Artistically speaking, when a content creator avoids the depiction of
marks, it sends the message that the image does not represent the real
world, or is somehow apart from it. Fabricated brands such as “Duff” beer
and “Morley” cigarettes,155 and brand-free environments such as the entire
151. See supra, Part II.A.
152. Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films
into Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 326 (1992) (“If a movie is to accurately depict
today’s America, it also must depict the commercialization that has seeped into every corner of our
society.”).
153. 76 F. App’x 389 (2d Cir. 2003).
154. Id. at 391–92 (dismissing federal trade dress infringement claims on the sole ground that
the plaintiffs had not sufficiently identified a distinctive trade dress in Times Square, and holding
that state trademark claims should be dismissed without prejudice to re-pleading).
155. The Simpsons (20th Century Fox Television 1989) (“Duff” beer); The X-Files (20th
Century Fox Television 1993) (“Morley” cigarettes).
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grocery store filled with generic cans and boxes in the movie Wanted,156
tell the viewer that the story takes place in an environment different from
our own, even when they evoke the image of real brands (as the red and
white Morley boxes evoked Marlboro cigarettes).157 In contrast, viewers’
first introduction to the character Cameron Frye in the movie Ferris
Bueller’s Day Off—a still life of over-the-counter pharmaceuticals arrayed
next to his bed (Vicks VapoRub, Alka-Seltzer, Bayer, Robitussin)—tells
viewers instant information about his character.158 Interpreting an
assortment of generic bottles would have required greater effort on the part
of the viewer, and could have been misinterpreted as a message that
Cameron could not afford name-brand cold remedies (a message far from
the movie’s truth).159 And in some cases—take, for example, the use of a
Polaroid camera as a memory aid in the film Memento—it would be
virtually impossible to tell a story without showing brand names or trade
dress.160 Having to avoid the depiction of real-world products and services
thus poses a challenge for content creators who wish to depict the real
world, raising their production costs and making certain angles and scenes
simply impossible.161 This problem is particularly debilitating for the
creators of documentaries, whose non-fiction depictions become less real
with every concession made to the removal of brands.162
A second creative harm that arises when marks are removed from the
public vocabulary is the loss of the communicative power of brands as
cultural icons. Markholders go to great lengths to cultivate brand images
that go beyond mere source identification, and these brand images have
become part of our cultural vocabulary.163 Advertising has taught us, for
156. WANTED (Universal Pictures 2008).
157. See Thompson Remarks, supra note 115 (“If we don’t have an integration with someone,
that means we have to ‘Greek’ everything. So State Farm Insurance would be you know, ‘Stock
Farm Insurance’ or some fictitious thing, that for me takes me completely out, or like Budweiser is
‘Fudweiser.’ And those are the Greeks that go on. And as a viewer, I’m like ‘that’s not even real.’
And it takes me out worse than an integration does.”).
158. See FERRIS BUELLER’S DAY OFF (Paramount Pictures 1986).
159. See id.
160. MEMENTO (Newmarket Capital Group 2000).
161. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 14 (“To get permission for every fleeting
mention or appearance of a trademarked item would require production teams to expend enormous
amounts of additional time and effort. But proceeding without such permission exposes TV and
filmmakers to potential claims for tarnishment, dilution, unfair competition, product disparagement,
and false endorsement under the Lanham Act, among others.”).
162. See AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 10, at 5 (describing particular trademark challenges
to documentarians as “[w]hen a trademark appears on a [subject’s] baseball cap . . . rights clearance
becomes a professional and creative challenge.”). In the last several years, this concept has received
attention in the copyright field, as documentary filmmakers have struggled with difficult copyright
fair use decisions regarding what can and cannot be included in their works. The Center for Social
Media’s Documentary Filmmaker’s Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use addresses these issues.
Id. at 3.
163. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 11, at 397–98; Gibson, supra note
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example, that Mac people are different from PC people, and that Barbie is
a paragon (albeit a controversial one) of youthful glamour. We have
learned, from a combination of publicity and pricing, that products from
the Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy group are not only expensive leather
goods, champagnes, and cognacs, but are also associated with wealth,
luxury, and indulgence. These images have become part of our shared
national language. Indeed, these brands’ identities transcend national
borders; Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, for example, have worked around the
world to cultivate images of universality, ubiquity, and youthful frivolity
that go well beyond their mere source-identifying functions as purveyors of
soft drinks and fast food. These brand identities not only help to drive sales
for markholders, but have powerful expressive capabilities: When Britney
Spears drives a pink Humvee upholstered in Louis Vuitton through the
clouds in her Do Somethin’ video, she conveys an image not only of
fantasy but also of luxury;164 and the Coca-Cola bottle that falls from the
sky into an aboriginal village in The Gods Must Be Crazy serves as an
engine for the film not only because it is a symbol of the world outside the
village, but also because the impact of this bottle’s intrusion into aboriginal
life contrasts with Coca-Cola’s brand images.165
2. Conflicts with Trademark Policy
To the extent that concerns over trademark liability result in a
constriction of the creative vocabulary of expressive works, this effect
stands in direct opposition to a number of the policies underlying
trademark law. In creating the current tapestry of trademark protection,
Congress and the courts have taken pains to ensure that trademark law does
not remove words or symbols from circulation any more than absolutely
necessary to prevent consumer confusion and, on some occasions, to
protect the breadth of the American vocabulary even when such protection
would lead to consumer confusion.166 For example, descriptive words and
5, at 933 (“Numerous commentators have observed that trademarks frequently assume a role in
popular rhetoric that has little to do with the cost-lowering, source-identifying function for which
the law provides protection.”); Kozinski, supra note 11, at 454–58 (observing the expressive
capability of marks: “Some ideas—‘it’s the Rolls-Royce of its class,’ for example—are difficult to
express any other way”); Litman, supra note 11, at 1730 (noting value in brand identity that
transcends source identification); Newman, supra note 6, at 357–59 (discussing the cultural value
of trademarks).
164. SPEARS, supra note 106.
165. THE GODS MUST BE CRAZY (Cat Films 1980). The film also prominently features a highly
unreliable Land Rover vehicle—an unflattering portrayal of the automotive brand that contrasts
with Land Rover’s brand message of adventure, excitement, and the ability to handle hostile
conditions—and a use that, I speculate, would not have survived if the filmmakers had needed Land
Rover’s permission to use the vehicle mark. Id.
166. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 11 (discussing trademark law’s doctrinal support of
free speech and expression).
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surnames cannot be protected as trademarks unless they have developed
secondary meaning as source identifiers of a particular good or service—
and even then, descriptive words may still be used in a descriptive
manner.167 This doctrine, known as classic trademark fair use, permits the
use of descriptive terms in a descriptive manner even when such use is
likely to create a likelihood of confusion.168 Along the same lines, the
doctrine of nominative fair use permits the use of a trademark to refer to a
product or service when: (1) the product or service in question is not
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) no more of the mark
or marks is used than reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service; and (3) the user does nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.169
Although confusion may arise from permitted nominative uses, it is more
important that people be able to make reference to marks in expressing
themselves than it is for the Lanham Act to eradicate all potential
confusion regarding sponsorship.170 Cases that restrict the use of marks in
entertainment risk running afoul of these policies.
Trademark law’s prohibition on the protection of generic terms ensures
that the law does not lock away the basic tools of communication, and the
law’s fair use provisions recognize that it may be impossible to express
oneself without using marks. As discussed above, certain things—instant
cameras and automobiles, for example—simply cannot be depicted easily
without incidentally showing at least part of a distinctive trademark or
trade dress.171 Yet—in conflict with the policies underlying the law—
litigation may arise even from uses for which digital alteration is virtually
the only alternative to showing a brand name. This was the case in
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
168. See KP Permanent Makeup, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121–22
(2004) (“Some possibility of consumer confusion is compatible with fair use . . . . The common
law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of consumers followed from the very
fact that in cases like this one an originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not
to mention the undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a
descriptive term simply by grabbing it first.”) (citation omitted).
169. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
170. The nominative fair use specifically examines whether the defendant did anything beyond
the use of the mark that would imply sponsorship or endorsement. See id. Thus, while mere use of
the mark may be confusing, the test tolerates such potential confusion in the absence of evidence
that the defendant’s actions, in conjunction with the use of the mark, implied sponsorship or
endorsement. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Franklin Mint’s statements regarding the “authenticity” of its Princess Diana themed
product, and statements that proceeds from sales would be donated to “Diana, Princess of Wales’
Charities” did not imply sponsorship or endorsement for purposes of nominative fair use).
171. See, e.g., Gary Thompson Remarks, supra note 115 (responding to those who criticized
his acceptance of product placement for the car KITT in the 2008 Knight Rider by explaining: “It’s
a show about a car. I need a car. . . . the Camaro went to Transformers (the movie) and they’re not
going to let us have it, what car do you want me to use? I mean, it’s a show about a talking car.”).
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Emerson Electronics Co. v. NBC Universal Television Studios Inc.,172 in
which the maker of the “InSinkErator” in-sink disposal sued the producers
of the television show Heroes regarding a scene in which a cheerleader
with powers of invincibility mangles her hand in an in-sink disposal unit
(with the “InSinkErator” brand name visible), only to have the hand heal
itself a moment later.173
Suits like the Emerson Electronics case seem to be founded on the
erroneous premise that a trademark conveys a property right subject to
trespass, and that such trespass occurs when someone other than the
markholder displays the mark without the consent of the markholder. This,
in essence, would create a secondary market in the display of a mark
divorced from its underlying product or service—a market that does not
and cannot exist. Such a secondary market defeats the basic premise that
trademarks exist to identify the source of goods and services, and do not
convey rights in gross.174 Trademark law reflects this tenet in several areas,
including the rule that a mark is abandoned if it is assigned “in gross,” that
is, without the right to produce or provide the good or service underlying
the mark.175
While trademarks may be valuable assets, they do not provide realproperty-type exclusive rights in the style of copyright and patent, for good
reason. Because trademarks exist primarily to convey information about
products and services, many unauthorized uses do not detract from the
purpose of trademark.176 Consumers receive information about products
and services from myriad sources, many of which are not controlled by
markholders—word of mouth, news, entertainment—and each of those
sources contributes to the richness of brand identity. Personal experience
watching a friend’s children enjoy Cheerios cereal contributes to its brand
identity, as do news reports about the cereal’s health benefits, as does a
movie scene in which characters chow down on Cheerios as part of a
172. Emerson Elec. Co. v. NBC Universal Television Studios, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 01454 (E.D.
Mo. 2006). The case settled in February, 2007, after four months of litigation. NBC ultimately
agreed to remove the “InSinkErator” brand from future airings of the program. Falkenberg &
McNamara, supra note 80. A less wealthy producer would not necessarily have had the resources
required to meet such demands.
173. Heroes (NBC Universal Television 2006); Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 1.
174. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (stating a trademark
is not a “right in gross” and “[t]he owner of a trade-mark may not, like the proprietor of a patented
invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly”).
175. See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
§ 18:2–:3 (4th ed. 2006).
176. Jessica Litman makes a similar point in Breakfast with Batman: to the extent that brand
identity transcends source identification, that brand identity is not the exclusive property of the
markholder. “While there is nothing wrong with encouraging [a markholder] to sell the public on
atmospherics and to devise clever ways to exploit those atmospherics commercially, neither
incentive theory nor moral desert offers a reason to protect them from competition.” Litman, supra
note 11, at 1734–35.
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suburban breakfast. General Mills (the owner of the Cheerios mark) may
control none of these uses that nonetheless strengthen, rather than weaken,
the Cheerios mark. If these obvious and universal uses were prohibited by
trademark law (or were only permitted with permission of General Mills),
they likely would not occur: families would refrain from eating cereal in
public, news reports would be cut, and—as discussed above—branded
props would disappear. Moreover, if General Mills had a display right in
its mark, it would have to enforce that right in order to maintain its mark.
This is true not only because the current system prevents “naked licensing”
(that is, permitting others to use one’s mark without exercising control
over the goods and services associated with the mark),177 but also because
of the recursive problem identified above—if consumers know that a
markholder has the ability to control every imaginable use of its mark,
consumers will believe that all such uses are controlled, and will be
confused by unauthorized uses.178 Thus, a system that creates a “display
right” in marks prevents rich brand identities from forming. And depriving
marks of the opportunity to grow such meaning reduces their value to
consumers as source identifiers, thereby subverting the purpose of
trademark law.179
And yet even if the law permitted a display right in trademarks, it would
still result in a Catch-22 for content creators. In cases in which it is
impossible to depict something without depicting marks—such as the
Emerson case, or a depiction of Times Square (which necessarily depicts
the many advertisements that festoon its buildings)—content creators may
face suits for trademark infringement if they elect to remove the marks
digitally. In Sherwood 48 Associates v. Sony Corp. of America,180 the
owners of Times Square billboards sued the creators of the film SpiderMan for trade dress infringement when the film contained digitally
replaced images of the billboards.181 The Second Circuit dismissed the
federal trade dress claim—but only on the basis that the plaintiff had not
adequately described a distinctive trade dress in Times Square.182 The court
held open the possibility of both federal and state trademark claims for

177. “Naked licensing” doctrine has the potential to create a sort of Catch-22 for markholders
as well as content creators. To the extent that the law did require permission for every use of a mark
in an expressive content, it could create an impossible policing burden for markholders. The irony
of achieving ultimate protection would be that markholders could be perceived as abandoning their
marks if they did not seek to stop all unauthorized uses—an unlikely outcome, but nonetheless an
immense burden that most markholders would likely find intolerable. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note
175, § 18:48.
178. See supra Part II.C.
179. Gulasekaram, supra note 6, at 908–10.
180. 76 F. App’x 389 (2d Cir. 2003).
181. Id. at 390.
182. Id. at 391.
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digital alteration of distinctive trade dress.183 In addition, a content creator
who attempts to avoid liability by using a faux mark that may call to mind
a genuine mark but is distinct from it—a practice well-accepted in the field
of “house brands”—may face liability as well. In E.S.S. Entertainment
2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.,184 the court held that the creators of
the video game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas were precluded from
relying on the defense of nominative fair use when the owners of the “Play
Pen” strip club objected to the game’s use of the name “Pig Pen” to
identify an in-game strip club.185 The combination of Emerson with the
Sherwood 48 and E.S.S. cases puts content creators in an untenable
position—they must either license marks (which may not be possible in
light of creators’ limited resources or creative restrictions that markholders
may place on licensed uses) or avoid marks entirely (which not only
sacrifices verisimilitude but may make some creative expressions
impossible). Should the broadcaster of a sports game be required to clear
all of the visible marks on clothes worn by the crowd? Absurd—yet under
these cases, a possible outcome.
3. The Chill of Increased Transaction Costs and Markholder
Control
It is true that some content creators who wish to express verisimilitude,
location, or characterization through the use of marks are free to license the
use of those marks. If one markholder refuses to provide a license, other
comparable marks may be available for licensing. Yet, the problems
created by the lack of clarity in the law are not prone to self-repair through
market forces. The current legal climate of risk aversion, insurance
restrictions, and widespread consumer assumptions about product
placement does not strike a balance between speech and mark protection.
Instead, every use of a mark in entertainment must be either placed or
licensed.
These constraints, even if taken to the extreme, do not eliminate the
ability of content creators to communicate using marks, but they do
provide markholders with nearly unlimited control over the use of marks in
entertainment. This does not necessarily benefit consumers. As Wendy
Gordon has noted, it does not benefit society to require permission for the
use of marks unless we assume that the markholder’s interests are aligned
with society’s.186 These interests may be aligned in the case of neutral and
183. Id. at 391–92.
184. 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).
185. Id. at 1098–99. Ultimately, the court found no infringement, on other grounds. Id. at
1099–1101.
186. Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Commodification and
Market Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 149 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil
Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002); see also Rothman, supra note 123, at 1949 (“Trademark
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positive depictions of marks; it is almost certainly not true in the case of
negative depictions of marks, for which markholders stand like foxes
guarding the henhouse of free expression. Moreover, regardless of the
actual likelihood of litigation, fear of litigation and ambiguity in the law
have forced content creators to become more and more constrained in all of
their depictions of marks (positive, neutral, and negative), even when they
may believe that such uses are unlikely to be infringing or dilutive. By
definition, this stifles expression well beyond the trade-off necessary to
prevent consumer confusion. The scuttled production of the film
Moneyball is but one example among many.187 Even beyond speech
ramifications, this process—receiving clearance for some marks, and
working around or blurring others—inherently increases the transaction
costs involved in making a creative product. As this increased cost
discourages content creators who are unwilling or unable to incur the
additional (financial and artistic) costs imposed by trademark restriction,
the restrictions ultimately (and ironically) harm content consumers—those
whom the trademark laws were originally designed to benefit.188
When markholders hold the reins of trademark use in entertainment,
they gain control over content by maintaining control over the context in
which their marks appear. Few, if any, markholders are willing to license
(or place) their marks for use in a creative setting without some ability to
approve or disapprove of such uses.189 When marks are placed or licensed,
markholders maintain (and are likely to exercise) the ability to eliminate
negative depictions of their products and services.190 The clearance process
protection . . . must consider the protection of businesses’ goodwill and the prevention of consumer
confusion, as well as the need for both consumers and competitors to refer to others’
trademarks. . . . How exactly one would divide up these rights is a matter of much debate, but most
people would agree that an optimal allocation of IP rights requires consideration of these sometimes
competing interests.”).
187. See Cieply, supra note 131.
188. Gibson, supra note 5, at 932–34 (“When filmmakers, writers, and other artists avoid using
some of our most meaningful cultural referents for fear of being sued, culture suffers.”).
189. Attorneys are counseling their clients to treat product placements and cleared uses just as
regular commercials and to exercise maximum content control over those uses. See, e.g., James H.
Johnson, Weathering the Perfect Storm: Product Placement and Intellectual Property, 20 LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER 56, Nov. 18, 2005, at 3; Glen M. Zatz, Lease, Camera, Action!, 36 MICH. REAL
PROP. REV. 26, 28 (Spring 2009) (“[U]nless you can be comfortable as to the theme of the movie
and as to how your company name will be portrayed, you risk damage to your image.”). Indeed, one
might even argue that failure to do so would constitute “naked licensing,” a form of mark
abandonment that occurs when a markholder licenses its mark for use without exercising some
degree of oversight or quality control over the product or service to be associated with the mark.
See, e.g., Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 596–97 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding naked licensing resulted in abandonment of the licensor’s mark when the licensor failed to
exercise quality control over the licensee).
190. Creative control is a factor for both paid placements and unpaid authorized uses. See 1
Jay Kenoff & Richard K. Rosenberg, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS 18–37 (Donald C.
Farber ed., 2002) (noting approval rights are negotiated among parties; suppliers seek approval over
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thus places important storytelling tools off-limits. If all uses of marks
require markholder approval, what does the villain drive?191 Would the TV
show 24 be barred from its frequent practice of distinguishing “good guys”
from “bad guys” by making the good guys use Mac computers and the bad
guys use PCs?192
Under the current system, content creators not only lose control over
their productions, but also must pay more to create them. The transaction
costs involved with obtaining permission to use marks mean that the
chilling effects of the current system are felt disproportionately by small
and independent content creators, who may lack not only the resources to
license marks, but also the market penetration to secure product placement
benefits. A stunning irony results: risk-averse content creators will avoid
using marks in positive or neutral contexts, but may feel more comfortable
the manner in which their products are depicted, and “[t]he larger the fee paid by the supplier, the
more important it will be for the supplier to have some form of approval over the use of the
product”); Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 14 (discussing unpaid authorized uses and
stating, “Where products are featured in a flattering or neutral manner, owners of the products
typically approve of the use. Manufacturers will sign a release approving of the use so long as the
product is not shown in a disparaging manner”); Johnson, supra note 189, at 3 (“The custodians of
a brand are not just responsible for protecting the brand from infringement, but the image of the
brand as well. Therefore, brand owners should make sure that they understand the context in which
their brands or other intellectual property are going to appear. The intellectual property owner
should retain the right to review and approve the final version of the use of the intellectual property
as well as the use in advertising. He or she should treat the product placement as he would a more
traditional advertisement by establishing internal procedures and policies to make sure that no
consent or placement occurs that would damage the image of the brand.”); Lewis, supra note 80, at
10 (“The more the industry shifts from free product placement to payment for branded integration,
the greater the pressure for producers to defer their creative control in favor of advertiser
demands.”); Lipka, supra note 98, at A21 (stating universities restrict depictions of fictional alumni:
“no diplomas or sweatshirts unless a character will do his alma mater proud”); Shagin & Savare,
supra note 7, at 35 (noting that in determining whether to place products, product placement
agencies consider, among other things, the degree to which content creators are amenable to
creative changes); see also Presentation by Tom Meyer, President of Davey- Brown Entertainment
[a product placement agency], at the Paley Center for Media, October 8, 2009 (“You get your brand
manager talking directly to a creative [e.g., a writer], and . . . even if they get along in the first
meeting, by the time you get to being done, there’s probably been a knock-down drag ‘em
out . . . .”). When products are placed, markholders have, on occasion, required rewrites or reshoots to improve the visibility of their products. Robert Adler, Here’s Smoking at You, Kid: Has
Tobacco Placement in the Movies Really Stopped?, 60 MONT. L. REV. 243, 247 (1999). A content
creator’s unwillingness to make such creative concessions may result in contract litigation. See
Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Tristar Pictures, Inc., Civ. No. 96-8982 SVW (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 23, 1996)
(concerning the removal of a scene featuring Reebok shoes from the film Jerry Maguire).
191. See Thompson Remarks, supra note 115 (“Because Ford sponsors the car, other
automotive places will not allow us to use their vehicles in chases or bad guys or anything like that;
so it sort of becomes problematic because then Ford also doesn’t want bad guys driving their
product either.”).
192. 24 (Imagine Entertainment 2001); Bryan Chaffin, Mac Sightings: Fox’s ‘24’ Sports
Massive Mac Presence, MAC OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 2001, http://www.macobserver.com/article/20
01/11/07.5.shtml.
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using harmful depictions without authorization, as long as these depictions
(however destructive they may be) are not likely to be “confusing” to
consumers.
These harms are also not prone to self-reversal through altered
behavior. The expansion of trademark rights may be exacerbated by the
tendency of content creators to license and/or blur marks even when it is
unnecessary to do so. However, for several reasons, the cessation of such
behavior is unlikely to result in a system in which trademark law accurately
tracks harm. First, there is little to encourage content creators to refrain
from seeking permission to use marks, especially when insurance carriers
frequently insist upon such permissions. Second, there is little to encourage
markholders to permit the unlicensed use of marks, because even
markholders are likely to prefer having control over content, even if the
alternative is a positive uncontrolled depiction. Third, to the extent that
content creators do elect to use unauthorized marks, they are likely to do so
in the safest possible circumstances from a litigation standpoint, such as
when the mark is presented unobtrusively, neutrally, or positively. Because
these benign uses are less likely to result in litigation, they are less likely to
result in a clarification of the rules for other content creators. At the same
time, however, to the extent the uses are neutral or positive, there is a
chance they may reinforce consumers’ assumptions that every use of a
mark is a product placement.
In addition to stifling speech, a climate that denies content creators the
option of using marks without authorization may also under-serve
markholders to some degree, since content creators may elect to forego
using a mark rather than licensing it or providing an opportunity for
placement. Because the law is unclear,193 content creators are faced with
the identical binary decision for each desired mark. If the law were clear
that some uses needed to be licensed and others didn’t, content creators
with limited resources would be able to use the marks that did not require
authorization. This would leave them with more resources to devote to
licensing or negotiating for placement of those marks whose uses would be
infringing if used without authorization.
III. CRAFTING A SYSTEM
To address the harms discussed in section II, an ideal system for
regulating trademark use in entertainment would maximize trademark
value without sacrificing an ounce of free expression. But no system can
demand absolute perfection. A certain degree of restriction on speech is to
be expected with any intellectual property law. Chilled expression is a
trade-off we make in exchange for the benefits of copyright, patent, and
trademark protection. Ideally, however, intellectual property laws are
193. See infra Part III.A.2.
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formulated and implemented in a way that balances as large an intellectual
property benefit as possible against as small a speech-chilling effect as
possible.
The current system is far from ideal. It chills speech through a
symbiotic relationship between content creators’ risk aversion and the
expansion of trademark rights. This is fueled by the law’s dependence on
consumers’ increasing awareness of product placement and marketing
practice, and exacerbated by legal ambiguity. Thus, the law (in cooperation
with content creators’ own actions and consumers’ growing knowledge),
has served to prevent unauthorized trademark uses far beyond the level that
would be required to prevent trademark harm. This clearly disserves
content creators, whose hands are tied creatively. Beyond that, however, it
also fails at the goal of maximizing trademark value: risk-averse content
creators deny markholders the brand exposure of potentially-beneficial
unauthorized uses, and markholders still face the possibility that
unauthorized uses that do not confuse consumers may still be permitted to
tarnish marks with impunity.
Ideally, a trademark system would avoid these ills. It would prevent
trademark harm without precluding or discouraging potentially beneficial
uses; it would be clear enough to minimize risk aversion; it would take into
account consumers’ awareness of product placement and mark licensing to
the extent they were relevant to trademark harm, without allowing that
awareness to dictate the scope of the law; and it would be mindful of free
speech concerns. But why does the current system—which was built with
many of these concerns in mind—fall so short of achieving these goals?
A. Why Doesn’t the Current System Work?
1. Missing the Target
At its core, trademark law exists not to prevent consumer confusion in
and of itself, but to prevent the harm that results from that confusion. This
includes harm to consumers through passing off and the loss of brand
reliability as well as harm to markholders through loss of goodwill, brand
identity, and ultimately, sales. For the most part, consumer confusion is an
adequate proxy for these harms because these harms stem from consumer
confusion. But consumer confusion may not map perfectly to consumer or
markholder harm. The mere fact that confusion is likely to occur in a given
circumstance does not necessarily mean that such confusion is inherently
harmful to consumers or markholders. In fact, the same factors that have
led to an increase in product placement (and with it, an increase in the
potential for consumer confusion) also mean that some types of
unauthorized uses are likely to benefit markholders rather than harm them.
Thus, in analyzing the degree to which current trademark law succeeds
at minimizing trademark harm, we should ask two questions: (1) Is the
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current likelihood of confusion formulation effective at identifying
circumstances under which consumers are most likely to be confused; and
(2) are the current formulations of likelihood of confusion and dilution
laws effective at identifying circumstances in which consumers and
markholders are most likely to be harmed?
In response to the first question, in theory, any time a mark is used
without authorization, consumers could conceivably be confused into
believing that the markholder sponsored and/or approved of the underlying
work, or that there is an affiliation between the mark and the content
creator. In most cases, the likelihood of such confusion is slight. The
likelihood of confusion grows, however, through a vicious cycle. As
consumers become increasingly aware of the prevalence of product
placement, content creators become increasingly hesitant to show
unauthorized marks without blurring or otherwise obscuring them, and
consumers correspondingly begin to assume that all mark appearances are
the result of product placement.
In practice, the degree of likelihood of confusion stemming from any
unauthorized use may depend on the specific use. For the most part, recent
cases dealing with unauthorized mark uses have concerned negative
depictions of marks. These cases have held that such depictions are
unlikely to be confusing because consumers are less likely to believe that
the appearance of a mark is sponsored or approved by a markholder if the
mark is depicted in such a way that the markholder would not approve.194
Outside the courtroom, however, even negative depictions may give rise to
confusion, particularly as marketing strategies broaden in a world of
advertising saturation. In recent years, markholders have increasingly
adopted the philosophy that any attention is good attention, and have
publicized their brands in ways that some might consider “tarnishing.”195
Examples include New York City’s licensing of its subway logos for use
on condoms, and dual-licensed “rivalry figurines” that show one school’s
mascot being humiliated by another.196 Absolut Vodka has also placed its
mark in expressive works that some might find objectionable, such as the
product’s appearance as the sole item protecting a male model’s modesty
194. See Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1077
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Where the use of the mark is in an unflattering context or a setting which would
be disadvantageous to the mark’s holder, it would seem customer confusion as to endorsement or
affiliation is particularly unlikely.” (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Inc. v. Loompanics Enters.,
Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1232, 1242 (D. Md. 1996))); Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality
Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“[R]ational analysis of the situation
does not indicate a likelihood that the public will believe that the Girl Scouts are the authors of the
poster to which they understandably take such violent exception.”).
195. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits
on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352, 352 (2007),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/04/25/tushnet.html.
196. See id. (discussing condom and rivalry-mascot licensing).
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on the show Sex and the City.197 If consumers are aware of the growing
prevalence of such controversial advertisements and placements—and even
if they are not—consumers may assume that the markholder was willing to
sponsor or approve of a use that demeans the mark. This, in turn, could
harm consumers’ attitudes toward the brand or the markholder. In addition,
even if consumers are not confused, unauthorized negative uses could lead
to tarnishment, if consumers adopt a negative association with a mark by
virtue of its depiction.198 As discussed below, however, dilution law is
unlikely to put a stop to such tarnishment.199
Fewer cases have addressed the question of how the traditional
likelihood of confusion test treats unauthorized positive or neutral
depictions of marks. This is understandable; markholders are less likely to
object to positive and neutral depictions with the fervor required to justify
litigation, and thus disputes over such uses are less likely to become public.
When litigation has arisen, it has provided little aid in solidifying the
current doctrine’s approach to likelihood of confusion. Although at least
one court has expressed skepticism in dicta regarding the likelihood of
confusion that could arise from a simple positive or neutral unauthorized
use,200 courts have not ratified that view in binding precedent. The Gottlieb
case, regarding the use of a pinball machine in the background of the film
What Women Want,201 was decided on a motion to dismiss for failure to
allege facts supporting a claim of confusion.202 And Bell Helicopter’s suit
against Electronic Arts regarding its (at worst, neutral, but generally
positive) depiction of Huey helicopters in the game Battlefield Vietnam
settled out of court before reaching the dispositive motion stage.203 In the
absence of court guidance, markholders have pressed content creators to
avoid even neutral or favorable unauthorized uses, and risk-averse content
creators, fueled in part by insurance concerns, have become wary of using

197. Sex and the City (Home Box Office July 27, 2003).
198. In essence, this was the holding in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., in which the creators of the pornographic film Debbie Does Dallas costumed their
characters in uniforms that were confusingly similar to those worn by the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders. 604 F.2d 200, 202–03 (2d Cir. 1979). The Second Circuit granted preliminary
injunction because viewers were likely to believe that the Dallas Cowboys had sponsored or
approved the film; however, the court’s reasoning rang in the language of tarnishment: “[I]t is hard
to believe that anyone who had seen defendants’ sexually depraved film could ever thereafter
disassociate it from plaintiff’s cheerleaders.” Id. at 205.
199. See infra notes 200–15 and accompanying text.
200. Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 634–36 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (expressing, in dicta, skepticism that the unauthorized use of a branded car in a car chase
would give rise to a successful claim for likelihood of confusion (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt
Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919–20 (C.D. Ill. 2003))).
201. WHAT WOMEN WANT (Paramount Pictures 2000).
202. Gottlieb, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
203. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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marks without authorization even in neutral or favorable contexts.204
On its face, this would appear to show that the current system is
ineffective at identifying circumstances in which trademark harm is most
likely to occur. Courts are unlikely to find confusion when a mark is
depicted negatively, even though negative depictions seem more likely to
harm a mark’s image and even though such confusion is increasingly likely
to occur. Courts are more likely to find confusion when a mark is depicted
positively; however, risk aversion pressure will prevent such uses, even
though such uses may be innocuous or even beneficial to trademark value.
Thus, while the current likelihood of confusion formulation may frequently
“get it right” in terms of identifying consumer confusion, it may not be as
good at identifying trademark harm.
But it is not that simple. Just as likelihood of confusion is not
necessarily determinative of trademark harm, negativity of depiction is not
either. In fact, a growing body of social science research tends to indicate
that trademark benefit or harm is more likely to be tied to the degree to
which the use of the mark is artistically relevant than to whether the use is
positive or negative.
In general, studies show that consumers react positively to the inclusion
of brands in entertainment. Brands add realism and aid in characterization
and context, making stories more relatable.205 Consumers generally react
far less favorably, however, to uses that are made without any legitimate
artistic purpose. Consumers often believe that gratuitous uses are
sponsored by the markholder, and even more commonly tend to retain
negative associations with a mark that is used without artistic
justification.206 Social science literature has documented this phenomenon,
mostly in the context of film and television. For example, one study found
that moviegoers expressed a strong dislike for brand props that “clashed
with their expectations of movie scenery.”207 Respondents associated
gratuitous brand uses with “promotion intent” and found that techniques
204. See supra Part II.B.3.
205. See, e.g., DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 71, 77, 79 (describing study participants’
overall favorable reaction to the use of branded props: “To informants in both studies, brand props
were significant because they add realism to the stylistic aspects of movie scenery.” Participants’
statements included the following: “they help to preserve the integrity of a movie with regard to
realism and projecting yourself into that movie”; “it lends an air of reality to it . . . an air of
authenticity.” According to the study, “Brand props were judged to add authenticity to movies when
associated with a particular setting, time period, or context.” Study participants also observed a
powerful ability of branded props to convey “relevant information about the character’s personality,
lifestyle, and role in the movie plot.”); Nelson, supra note 75, at 80, 85–87 (reporting video game
players were generally positive toward product placement and believed it added to game realism);
Sung et al., supra note 111, at 273 (“[R]espondents tend to agree that brand appearances make the
world within the film more realistic [and they] . . . have positive perceptions of product placement
realism.”).
206. See DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78.
207. DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78.
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such as “constant repetition of a brand, brands placed in inappropriate
settings (i.e., the brand ‘didn’t need to be there,’ was ‘unexpected,’ and
‘not natural’), and inappropriate camera techniques (i.e., ‘zeroed in,’
‘closeups on the name,’ and ‘camera sort of locks on it’) . . . detracted from
movie realism.”208 In addition, a number of studies discuss the effect of
“incongruence”: when the appearance of a product is not “highly connected
to the plot,” the incongruence of the brand’s appearance will prompt
viewers to question the brand’s presence in the show and to assume that
the brand’s presence is a sponsored or approved attempt to advertise.209
This “persuasion knowledge” adversely impacts viewers’ attitudes about
the brand.210 The same is true for video games.211 Thus, when a mark is
208. DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78.
209. See, e.g., Balasubramanian et al., supra note 84, at 115, 128 (discussing congruence
studies); Karrh et al., supra note 70, at 140 (discussing studies in which placements were received
more favorably when they were “congruen[t] with scenery” and “related to program content”);
Cristel Antonia Russell, Investigating the Effectiveness of Product Placements in Television Shows:
The Role of Modality and Plot Connection Congruence on Brand Memory and Attitude, 29 J.
CONSUMER RES. 306, 308–09 (2002) (noting viewers are distracted by the use of a brand when “the
mention of the brand in the dialogue is not justified by the story (lower plot audio) or when a visual
brand becomes an obvious focus of the story when it should serve an accessory role (higher plot
visual).”); Mei-Ling Wei et al., An Examination of the Effects of Activating Persuasion Knowledge
on Consumer Response to Brands Engaging in Covert Marketing, 21 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING
34, 34 (2008) (“In general, product placements are believed to be most effective when brands meld
seamlessly with the elements in which they are embedded.” (citation omitted)). Even in advertising,
research shows that “commercial watching increases with entertainment content and decreases with
information content.” Wilbur et al., supra note 79, at 3.
210. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cowley & Chris Barron, When Product Placement Goes Wrong, 37 J.
ADVERTISING, Spring 2008, at 89–90, 96 (discussing studies linking persuasion knowledge with
negative brand attitude: “Specifically, if the placement is pulled from the background where it
merely creates a context from which drama or humor emerges, to the foreground where the humor is
created as a vehicle to highlight the product, then prominent placements may interrupt the viewers’
‘suspension of disbelief.’ At this point, the persuasive intent interrupts the editorial content, which
may cause irritation.” Test subjects who liked the program were more likely to recognize brand
placements and to report lower brand attitudes in response. Test subjects who did not recognize
brand placements as such were more likely to report higher brand attitudes in response.); Alain
d’Astous & Francis Chartier, A Study of Factors Affecting Consumer Evaluations and Memory of
Product Placements in Movies, J. CURRENT ISSUES & RES. IN ADVERTISING, Fall 2000, at 31, 38
(“[T]he degree of integration of a placement within a movie scene has a positive impact on
consumer liking . . . [and] well integrated placements are significantly less likely to be perceived as
unacceptable[.]”); DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78; Wiles & Danielova, supra note 74, at
57–58 (reporting the results of a study supporting “pernicious effects of placement blatancy” and
“suggest[ing] that the worth of film product placement could depend on the match of the product,
the film, and the film’s audience”); see generally Eva Van Reijmersdal, Brand Placement
Prominence: Good for Memory! Bad for Attitudes?, 49 J. ADVERTISING RES. 151, 151–52 (2009)
(reviewing studies on prominence, congruence, and persuasion knowledge).
211. Nelson, supra note 75 (“[G]amers mentioned the ineffectiveness of obvious, out-ofcontext, or saturated use of placements as opposed to a few, unobtrusive brands. Gamers’ comments
reflected similar themes noted by film-viewers (DeLorme and Reid 1999). Placements are deemed
to be effective when used in subtle ways (players assume subliminal processing). However, when
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used without artistic justification, consumers seeking an explanation for a
mark’s depiction are more likely to believe that the use is sponsored—
falling back on their background knowledge that product placement is
commonplace and that some content creators blur unauthorized marks to
avoid creating the impression of a connection between the mark and the
content—and to think poorly of the underlying brand.212
In contrast, when a mark is used with artistic justification—for
example, when the use of the mark fits into its context as a reflection of
authenticity (i.e., verisimilitude), when the use of the mark makes a
symbolic or artistic point relating to the cultural meaning of a mark or its
underlying product or service, or when the mark is part of an effective
parody213—consumers are not only less likely to assume that the mark was
included as part of product placement, but are also more likely to come
away with a positive recollection of the mark, regardless of whether the
depiction was positive or negative.214
the placements are used in inappropriate ways, the players consciously reject the placements.”); id.
at 87 (“If the advertisements were poorly placed or did not match reality—then the advertisements
actually deterred from the game experience; however, if the advertisements were placed in scenes
that matched real life, then the brands actually enhanced the game experience.” “Relevancy” was
also found to be of particular importance for long-term recall of brands. Study participants objected
to product placements in situations “where advertisements would be oddly placed, like in forests” or
otherwise out-of-place, such as “[a] big flashing sign in Medieval Times . . . .”).
212. DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78; Savare, supra note 7, at 358 n.174 (noting
interviews reflecting widely held belief that most product placements are “gratuitous” and any
verisimilitude stemming from product placement is “simply an excuse to accept money.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
213. To be effective, “[a] parody must convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-messages:
that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.” Louis Vuitton
Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001)).
214. See Russell, supra note 209, at 308–09; see also Thompson Remarks, supra note 115
(“We did one episode where we made fun of the product, and [the markholders] were fine with it,
and actually sales went up . . . It’s just when you try and shove something down [the audience’s]
throats that they get very very upset.”); cf. Christian Schemer, et al., Does “Passing the
Courvoisier” Always Pay Off?: Positive and Negative Evaluative Conditioning Effects of Brand
Placements in Music Videos, 25 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 923, 935 (2008) (observing that
placement of mark in work of negatively-perceived performer tended to have negative effect on
brand attitude, among participants with a preference for the relevant type of music); Moonhee Yang
& David R. Roskos-Ewoldsen, The Effectiveness of Brand Placements in the Movies: Levels of
Placements, Explicit and Implicit Memory, and Brand-Choice Behavior, 57 J. OF COMM. 469, 483–
84 (2007) (reporting the results of a study showing that consumers preferred products shown in
movies over products not shown in movies; evidence indicated that positive effect was greater for
products used by main characters over those that were involved in the plot but not used by main
characters; authors suggest that “unusual and somewhat negative” depiction of product may
influence viewers’ preference, but also suggest that preference may be based on whether product is
used in a way consistent with “how the [product] is normally used[,]” implying that uses for
verisimilitude, symbolism, parody, or other artistically relevant purposes would result in greater
positive influence than artistically gratuitous uses).
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These studies indicate that likelihood of confusion is tied to trademark
harm—but not in the way conceived by the current likelihood of confusion
framework.215 In particular, the current likelihood of confusion framework
chills artistically relevant (and thus potentially beneficial) positive uses,
but is likely to permit artistically gratuitous (and thus potentially harmful)
negative uses.
2. Fostering Overprotection and Underprotection Through
Ambiguity
Ambiguities in the law encourage the culture of risk aversion and overlicensing that breeds overprotection. The Lanham Act defines confusion
expansively to include confusion as to sponsorship, approval, or
affiliation,216 and courts have expanded that definition further: a use is
defined as confusing if it permits consumers to infer “some connection”
between markholder and alleged infringer,217 or believe that the
markholder “‘goes along’ with” the use of the mark.218 More influential,
however, is the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis’ reliance on
consumer perception. As the First Circuit explained in Boston Athletic
Association v. Sullivan, the difficulty in relying on a factfinder’s
assessment of whether a particular product is sponsored or approved by a
markholder is that it depends on the factfinder’s own belief regarding what
the law requires:
Lacking such knowledge, the question of approval is pure
guesswork. To ask a factfinder to determine whether the
public would think that defendants’ shirts were “authorized”
or “official” shirts is to ask it to resolve a confusing and, in
many contexts, virtually meaningless question. Asking a
factfinder to make such a determination also raises a problem
215. There is an additional type of trademark harm, beyond loss of goodwill: a markholder’s
loss of control over its mark. However, the right to control one’s mark is limited to circumstances in
which consumers are likely to be confused. Markholders also do not have the right to control
nominative fair uses of their marks, as discussed below. See infra Part III.A.3.b. This is because a
trademark is not a right in gross—it is only the right to the goodwill associated with the source
identifying function of one’s mark. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. I posit, therefore, that
a use that violates a markholder’s right to control its mark but does not harm the mark’s goodwill,
much like a tree falling in an unoccupied forest, does not cause trademark harm.
216. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
217. See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 1989).
218. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400–01 (8th Cir. 1987) (basing decision
on whether consumers were likely to believe that markholder “went along with” the use of the
mark); see also Gibson, supra note 5, at 909–10 (discussing the expanding effect of imprecise
vocabulary and marshaling cases’ reliance on expansive and ambiguous terms such as
“endorsement,” “affiliation,” “association,” “connection,” “authorization,” “permission,” “license,
“of any kind,” “otherwise,” “in some other way,” “of some sort,” “in some way,” and “in some
fashion”).
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of circularity: “If consumers think that most uses of a
trademark require authorization, then in fact they will require
authorization because the owner can enjoin consumer
confusion caused by unpermitted uses or charge for licenses.
And if owners can sue to stop unauthorized uses, then only
authorized uses will be seen by consumers, creating or
reinforcing the perception that authorization is necessary. This
is a ‘chicken and the egg’ conundrum.”219
In the entertainment context, when consumers are increasingly likely to
believe that all trademark uses must be authorized by the markholder, this
“chicken and the egg conundrum” expands the risk of liability. Increased
risk then leads to over-licensing, which feeds back into consumer
assumptions.
The applicability of dilution law to trademark uses in expressive works
is similarly ambiguous, both in its commerciality requirement and in its
definition of tarnishment.220 These ambiguities not only compound the risk
aversion and over-licensing discussed above, but may also (ironically) lead
to underprotection of trademarks by the courts.
First, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) exempts from
dilution liability all “noncommercial” trademark uses.221 To the extent that
courts have addressed whether the use of a mark in an expressive context is
subject to the exemption, they have generally held that such uses are not
commercial.222 For example, the Ninth Circuit held in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc. that the band Aqua’s use of the “Barbie” mark in the song
Barbie Girl was non-commercial (and thus not subject to dilution liability)
because it did more than simply propose a commercial transaction.223 Few
courts have addressed the question, however, and ultimately it remains
subject to debate.224
Commentators are divided regarding whether trademark uses in
entertainment constitute commercial speech.225 At the heart of the debate
219. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33, quoting 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 24:3, at 170.
220. See generally Smith, supra note 57 (discussing inconsistency in application of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act and state dilution laws when free speech defenses have been proffered).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006).
222. But see American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn.
1998) (holding the film title “Dairy Queens” was commercial speech).
223. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906-07 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Burnett
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966, 973–74 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding
that references to Carol Burnett in the Fox television show Family Guy was non-commercial and
thus not subject to dilution liability).
224. For example, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–22 (C.D. Ill.
2003) and Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260–62 (N.D. Cal.
2003) each held that no dilution had occurred without addressing the non-commerciality question.
225. See, e.g., Gulasekaram, supra note 6, at 933–42; Savare, supra note 7, at 369–75 (arguing
that product placements should be classified as commercial speech); Snyder, supra note 152, at
302–03, 321–27.
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regarding whether product placement constitutes commercial speech is
whether the standards for commerciality should be applied to the work as a
whole or to the purpose behind the work’s use of a particular mark.226 If
the work as a whole is analyzed, any use of a mark in any expressive work
would be immune from dilution liability. As entertainment and advertising
merge, however, this line becomes fuzzier. Take, for example, BMW’s
series of short films entitled The Hire, which told complete episodic stories
while incidentally demonstrating various aspects of BMW’s vehicles and
building BMW’s brand identity.227 Few would argue that these films are
not expressive, yet they exist for an advertising purpose. Should the use of
marks in such advertisements be analyzed any differently from the use of
marks in more traditional entertainment, when much of that entertainment
exists only as a result of product placement, and the markholder control
that accompanies it?228 To the markholder, entertainment containing
product placement has as commercial a purpose as The Hire, and to the
consumer it is just as expressive.
The sounder approach would be to analyze the expressiveness of the
mark use (rather than the expressiveness of the work as a whole), so that
uses that do nothing more than propose a commercial transaction are
commercial, and uses that have some non-advertising expressive effect
would be non-commercial. Thus, product placements without artistic
relevance would qualify as commercial speech even when incorporated
into the most expressive works, and artistically relevant uses would qualify
as non-commercial even when authorized or placed in exchange for goods
or fees. This approach would be consistent with the holding in Mattel, Inc.
v. MCA Records, Inc.,229 and would be consistent with trademark law’s
focus on consumer perception as the arbiter of liability.230 Perhaps most
importantly for the present inquiry, it would also ensure that artistically
relevant uses would be immune from dilution liability.
Until the law is clarified, however, content creators cannot be confident
226. See Savare, supra note 7, at 370 (criticizing Snyder’s analysis: “If we are to evaluate the
constitutionality of governmental regulation of product placements in television, cable, or film, we
must ask if product placements are commercial speech, not whether they transform creative
expression into commercial speech.”).
227. Press Release, BMW North America, The Hire—The Acclaimed Film series by BMW—
Will End a Four and a Half Year Internet Run October 21st (Oct. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.bmwusa.com/Standard/Content/Uniquely/TVAndNewMedia/BMWFilmpressrelease.
aspx.
228. Put differently, on what basis should the use of Dustin Hoffman’s persona in a fashion
magazine editorial spread (humorously showing new clothes in a parody of the film Tootsie) be
treated differently from the use of Vanna White’s persona in an advertisement for Samsung
(humorously showing Samsung products in a parody of Wheel of Fortune)? See Mulcahy, supra
note 7, at 47–49 (discussing two cases with conflicting results on the question of commercial
speech).
229. 296 F.3d 894, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2002).
230. See supra Part III.A.1.
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of escaping dilution liability, and risk-averse content creators must be wary
of dilution law notwithstanding what seems to some to be an explicit
carve-out for their behavior. This compounds the speech-chilling effect.231
Moreover, it is not enough merely to clarify the dilution law’s meaning
of “noncommercial.” Even a sound reading of the law may permit undue
trademark harm. Perversely, this harm comes in the form of
underprotection, because the law immunizes one type of use that may
cause trademark harm—uses that are not sponsored advertising (and
therefore are not commercial speech) but also are not artistically relevant
(and therefore may lead to trademark harm). Current dilution law does not
prevent harm that may be caused by this very narrow band of uses.
Specifically, under the FTDA, dilution by tarnishment is defined as an
“association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and
a famous mark that harms the reputation of a famous mark.”232 On its face,
this provision applies when a mark, identical or similar to the
markholder’s, is used to designate the source of a product or service other
than the markholder’s—not to deal with the situation in which a mark is
being used to refer to the markholder’s own product or service, in a context
that may cast the markholder itself in a negative light.233 Cases decided
under a prior version of the FTDA held that tarnishment would occur
“when the plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or
is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke
unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product.”234 This interpretation
leaves a gap in protection that may permit potentially harmful uses, as
when a product or service is depicted in a manner likely to evoke
unflattering thoughts about the mark owner rather than the product.235
Disney threaded this gap in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.236 The
case dealt with the film George of the Jungle 2’s depiction of a number of
Caterpillar bulldozers, which the villain’s henchmen use to attack the
film’s jungle habitat.237 Caterpillar’s marks are clearly visible in at least
one scene during which the narrator describes them as “deleterious dozers”
and “maniacal machines.”238 The court held that tarnishment had not
occurred because viewers were likely to understand that the sources of
destruction were those manipulating the bulldozers rather than the
231. See supra Part II.C.1, 3.
232. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006).
233. See id.
234. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
235. This is not to imply that all such potentially harmful uses should be barred, only that they
escape dilution law as currently formulated. The benefits (e.g., free speech) of such uses may
outweigh their harms.
236. 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
237. GEORGE OF THE JUNGLE 2 (Walt Disney Pictures 2003); Caterpillar, 287 F. Supp. 2d at
917.
238. Id.
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bulldozers themselves.239 Yet it seems implausible that viewers would not
associate the Caterpillar brand with the destruction, even if they would not
attribute the destruction to Caterpillar’s volition.
Similarly, Paramount prevailed in the case of Wham-O, Inc. v.
Paramount Pictures Corp.240 This case concerned a seventy-second portion
of the film Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star in which the characters
misuse a “Slip ‘N Slide” toy.241 Paramount Pictures used the slide scene in
promotions for the film and created an interactive online game inspired by
the scene.242 Wham-O argued that the film’s depiction tarnished the Slip
‘N Slide mark.243 The court disagreed, holding that the depiction was not
tarnishing because the injury arose from an explicit misuse of the
product.244 Although the film may make the product seem “odd” or
“absurd,” the court held, it would not create a negative association in
consumers’ minds because it was clear that the product was not used in its
intended manner.245 The court did not consider, however, whether viewers
might make any association between the Slip ‘N Slide brand and the injury
associated with it in the film.246
Reasonable minds may disagree as to whether the uses in these cases
actually caused harm to Caterpillar and Wham-O. Regardless, however, the
court simply did not ask whether either film would create in consumers’
minds a negative association with the plaintiffs’ marks. This is not because
either case was wrongly decided under current law; rather, current law does
not admit the possibility that trademark harm might occur under such
circumstances.
To be clear, this does not counsel in favor of expanding current dilution
law further into the realm of expressive speech. Doing so could create
significant First Amendment problems in exchange for a relatively
insignificant trademark benefit, and would only compound the problems
created by risk aversion and rights expansion by giving content creators
(and their insurance carriers) yet another ambiguous doctrine to be
concerned about. However, an ideal system would address this potential
underprotection while also resolving the overprotection fostered by the
239. Id. at 922.
240. 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1261–65 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
241. DICKIE ROBERTS: FORMER CHILD STAR (Paramount Pictures 2003). The film features a
former child star, played by David Spade, who feels he has missed out on youth, and hires a family
to help him reclaim his childhood. The family kids introduce him to the Slip ‘N Slide toy, which he
proceeds to misuse (i.e., attempting to use the slide without lubricating it with water, then overlubricating the slide with cooking oil, and slamming into a fence). Id.; Wham-O, 286 F. Supp. 2d at
1257.
242. Id. at 1258.
243. Id. at 1261.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id.
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law’s ambiguity.
3. Relying on Unavailing Exceptions
A number of current doctrines create exceptions to the traditional
likelihood of confusion test, with the goal of preventing the law from
unduly stifling speech. In theory, these doctrines should also help slow the
“rights accretion” caused by the recursive effect of product placement and
risk aversion.247 In reality, however, these doctrines have not resolved the
problem, and may exacerbate it.248
a. “Classic” (Descriptive) Fair Use
The statutory doctrine of “classic” fair use permits the use of
descriptive marks used in a descriptive manner. Specifically, the Lanham
Act provides that a use is permitted if it is “otherwise than as a mark” and
is “the party’s individual name in his own business, or . . . the individual
name of anyone in privity with such party, or . . . a term or device which is
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods
or services of such party, or their geographic origin . . . .”249 This doctrine
permits Naturalizer to describe its pumps as feeling “like a sneaker,”
despite Easy Spirit’s “feels like a sneaker” motto and permits a permanent
makeup company to describe its service as using “microcolor” despite a
competitor’s “Micro Colors” brand.250
Thus, in theory, a film that features a fictitious television channel
focused on true-crime stories should be able to describe the fictitious
channel as “the crime channel”—even if such a description would create
confusion between the channel in the movie and a real-life channel known
as “The Crime Channel.” Yet this was not the case in Films of Distinction,
Inc. v. Allegro Film Productions, Inc.,251 which concerned the use of the
mark “Crime Channel” in the film Relative Fear. 252 The film centers on a
boy who commits a series of crimes, including murder, after watching a
television channel called the “Crime Channel.”253 This case demonstrates
247. See Tushnet, supra note 195, at 353.
248. Indeed, the proliferation of fair-use type exceptions may be part of the problem, rather
than part of the solution. As William McGeveran has discussed, the overlapping and ill-defined
boundaries of trademark fair use exceptions have made it difficult for attorneys to provide confident
trademark fair use advice, and have tended to exacerbate risk aversion. See McGeveran, supra note
11, at 110–11.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
250. United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 197, 199–200
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that Naturalizer’s use of the phrase
“feels like a sneaker” was classic fair use); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114–16, 124 (2004) (concerning “microcolor”).
251. 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
252. Id. at 1072–73.
253. Id. at 1073.
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the limitations of the classic fair use in defending against trademark claims
concerning the use of marks in entertainment. Although the film depicted
the Crime Channel as fictional, the Central District of California denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss because the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that
the film’s Crime Channel was confusingly similar to, and infringed, the
plaintiff’s “Crime Channel” mark.254 The court rejected the defense of
classic fair use on the ground that the film’s use of “Crime Channel” was
not “otherwise than as a mark”—that is, because they created a fictitious
mark, the creators of Relative Fear could not rely on the classic fair use
doctrine and could be liable for confusion-based infringement.255
b. Nominative Fair Use
More relevant to most situations is the common-law doctrine of
“nominative fair use,” which permits the use of a mark to describe the
markholder’s good or service when: (a) the product or service in question
is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (b) no more of the
mark or marks is used than reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service; and (c) the user does nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”256
This doctrine permits, for example, stores to advertise what products they
sell, and magazines to write news stories about branded products.257 When
the nominative fair use doctrine is asserted, these three prongs are applied
as a replacement to the traditional likelihood of confusion theory rather
than an exception to it.258 Thus, in theory, the doctrine of nominative fair
use should immunize a great many expressive uses of trademarks.259 It also
has the advantage of minimizing reliance on consumers’ ease of confusion
and awareness of product placement. In fact, more than one court has relied
on the doctrine in immunizing an artistic content creator from liability for
the use of distinctive trade dress.260 However, in practice, the existence of
254. Id. at 1076–77.
255. Id. at 1076. The court rejected the nominative fair use defense for the same reason. Id. at
1076–77.
256. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
257. Id. at 307–08.
258. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 220 (3d Cir.
2005) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s test established in New Kids on the Block “replaces the ‘likelihood
of confusion’ test for trademark cases where nominative fair use is asserted” (citing Cairns v.
Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted))).
259. Rebecca Tushnet adopts this approach, arguing that application of the nominative fair use
doctrine, in conjunction with other existing trademark doctrines, should be sufficient to minimize
trademark rights accretion as described by Gibson. Tushnet, supra note 195, at 357.
260. See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d 792, 796, 808 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the use of
Mattel’s distinctive Barbie trade dress in the photographic works entitled Food Chain Barbie was
nominative fair use); Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1255,
1263 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that the use of a Slip-N-Slide toy and reference to the toy by name
in the film Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star was nominative fair use).
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the nominative fair use doctrine, and even the application of the doctrine to
immunize certain trademark uses, does not appear to have reduced the risk
aversion that limits content creators’ ability to use trademarks as
expressive tools.
One reason for this is ambiguity in the law. By including the third
prong, i.e. that the user of the mark may do nothing to imply sponsorship
or endorsement by the markholder, the doctrine could be interpreted to be
vulnerable to the feedback loop of consumer confusion in the same way as
the traditional likelihood of confusion test. While the prong ostensibly
applies only to actions other than the use of the mark itself,261 in the case of
expressive uses, the context in which the mark is used may qualify as an
implication of sponsorship. This interpretation is supported by the New
Kids on the Block case, which looked to the context of the use to determine
whether it implied sponsorship and held that since the newspaper polls
identified the New Kids on the Block in a way that could be described as
critical, the use did not imply sponsorship.262 Under this interpretation, any
negative use of a mark would be protected by the nominative fair use
doctrine, while any positive use of a mark, and possibly any neutral use,
could be found to imply sponsorship and thus infringe.263 This gap in the
doctrine is not addressed by the Wham-O, Walking Mountain, or Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. cases, each of which concerned uses that (at
least arguably) cast the mark and its underlying product in a negative
light.264 Thus, the doctrine as applied leaves the fate of positive and neutral
uses in flux and does nothing to diminish risk aversion concerning such
uses.
More important, however, is the doctrine’s burden-shifting effect.
Although it is considered a replacement to the traditional likelihood of
confusion doctrine rather than an exception to it, the nominative fair use
analysis shifts the burden of proof from the markholder—who ordinarily
261. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (articulating test as assessing
defendant’s activity “in conjunction with the mark”); Walking Mountain, 353 F.2d at 811 (assessing
defendant’s activity “in conjunction with use of the mark” for indicia of sponsorship or approval).
262. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 304, 308–09 (determining that neither newspaper
announcement made an entirely positive statement about the New Kids on the Block—USA Today
announced “New Kids on the Block are pop’s hottest group. Which of the five is your fave? Or are
they a turn off?” and The Star announced “Now which kid is the sexiest?” and “Which of the New
Kids on the Block would you most like to move next door? STAR wants to know which cool New
Kid is the hottest with our readers”).
263. Note, however, that markholders themselves often license their marks for use in less-thanpositive contexts, like the New York transit offering condoms featuring their marks, or schools
licensing their marks for “rivalry mascots.” Tushnet, supra note 195.
264. In Wham-O, the film Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star depicted the main character
misusing the Slip-n-Slide and injuring himself, Wham-O, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 1255, 1257; in
Walking Mountain, the Food Chain Barbie artistic work was critical of the ideal of vapid beauty the
artist saw embodied by the Barbie doll, Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 811; in Mattel II, the Barbie
Girl song depicted Barbie as flighty and promiscuous, 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).
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must prove that a likelihood of confusion exists—to the content creator,
who now must prove that its use is not likely to confuse under the third
prong of the test.265 This makes it more difficult for content creators to
escape litigation at an early stage and therefore presumably tends to
increase content creators’ and insurance carriers’ risk aversion.
c. Use as a Trademark
A number of commentators have asserted that the Lanham Act imposes
a requirement that only “trademark uses” of a mark may infringe.266 For the
most part, courts have adopted this theory only in the context of Internet
keyword advertising, holding that the use of a mark as a keyword trigger
for an electronic advertising algorithm does not constitute a use of the
mark as a trademark, that is, the mark is not presented to consumers as
representing the source of a product or service.267 Outside the Internet
keyword context, however, the theory has gained little traction with
courts.268 James Gibson advances a species of this approach as a solution
to trademark rights accretion, suggesting that expressive uses of marks are
not “trademark uses” because when a mark is incorporated into an
expressive work, the mark is not being used to brand (i.e., sell) the
expressive work.269 He proposes that there should be no finding of
infringement unless the court finds confusion as to whether the markholder
sponsored or approved the expressive product as a whole (rather than
merely the trademark use).270
Superficially, “trademark use” theory would appear to resolve disputes
265. See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1029 (C.D.
Cal. 2006) (noting that, as a replacement for the traditional likelihood of confusion test, the
nominative fair use concept of suggesting sponsorship merges into likelihood of confusion, and
shifts the burden to defendants (citation omitted)); see also McGeveran, supra note 11, at 90–92
(discussing burden-shifting effect and other flaws in nominative fair use test).
266. See Denicola, supra note 11, at 193–207; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis,
Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2007);
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 139, at 478.
267. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005). But see
800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding that use as
Internet keyword is trademark use).
268. One exception—perhaps unique in its adoption of this theory outside the Internet
keyword context—is an unpublished disposition in Capp Enterprises v. Walt Disney Co., No. CV
03-03357 ABC (RZx) (C.D. Cal. YEAR), concerning allegedly infringing references to “Sadie
Hawkins Day” (a mark registered to Capp in connection with the comic strip “Li’l Abner”) in an
episode of the television show Lizzie McGuire. The court dismissed Capp’s complaint on multiple
grounds, including that “the mark was not used in a source-identifying (i.e. trademark) fashion.”
Order re Defendants Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 7, July 21, 2003.
269. Gibson, supra note 5, at 949.
270. Gibson, supra note 5, at 949–50. The Caterpillar Court espoused this theory to some
extent, basing its ruling in part on a holding that Disney was not trading on the popularity of the
Caterpillar mark in order to sell the George of the Jungle 2 film. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney
Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
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over uses of marks in expressive contexts because only the use of a mark
as a mark would give rise to liability—in contrast to the use of a mark as
an expressive tool. Deeper examination, however, reveals that Gibson’s
theory will neither rescue most expressive uses of trademarks from liability
nor diminish the feedback loop of trademark rights accretion. The
markholders’ concern is seldom the belief that content creators are freeriding on the value of a trademark in order to sell entertainment.271 Rather,
the challenge of trademark use in entertainment is that to the extent that a
consumer believes that a markholder has authorized the use of its mark, the
consumer will also believe that the markholder sponsors or approves of the
underlying work and/or the context in which the mark is used.272 Thus,
Gibson’s theory creates a false dichotomy. As Rebecca Tushnet explains,
“the requirement of ‘trademark use’ has difficulty dealing with the problem
that consumers may reasonably believe that Coca-Cola is a sponsor of
American Idol because its products appear on the show. If that isn’t
trademark use, what is it?”273 This challenge grows as more consumers
believe that any use of a mark requires markholder approval.
Moreover, even if non-trademark-use could embrace every situation in
which a mark is used in entertainment to refer to the markholder’s product
(rather than to refer to the work as a whole), it would not necessarily clarify
liability—it would just shift the question. Rather than asking whether
consumers believe that the markholder sponsored or approved of the use, it
would ask whether consumers believe that the markholders sponsored or
approved of the work as a whole. Consumers are unlikely to be more
reliable at performing that task than at assessing sponsorship of a particular
use, especially considering the degree of control that markholders often
exercise when they place or approve the use of marks,274 and considering
that markholders themselves are known to produce entire works—Hasbro
is a co-producer of the Transformers films,275 Nike, Coca-Cola, and Ford
271. But see Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452–58 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
song Rosa Parks used the civil rights icon’s name solely for the purpose of drawing attention to the
work, rather than for an artistic purpose).
272. Lemley and McKenna propose a much more radical approach: the abolition of
“sponsorship or approval” liability altogether, except to the extent that it is “materially” confusing
(and thus constitutes false advertising). Lemley & McKenna, supra note 18. This approach is
appealing in that it would eliminate much of the overprotection discussed herein, and help to curb
over-litigation. It is far from a panacea, however. First, it exacerbates the likelihood of
underprotection and harm from the artistically gratuitous misuse of marks in a way that may harm
brand reputation or markholder image. Second, it still permits suits for dilution and false
advertising, merely shifting the debate to whether confusion is “material.” This materiality prong
could easily end up resting on the same recursive question of consumer perception as the consumer
confusion test currently in place.
273. Tushnet, supra note 195, at 356.
274. See supra notes 190–91.
275. TRANSFORMERS (Dreamworks SKG 2007); TRANSFORMERS: REVENGE OF THE FALLEN
(Dreamworks SKG 2009).
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have adopted the role of program producers themselves,276 and BMW
created The Hire.277 In other words, the question of trademark use would
still be grounded in consumer understanding of sponsorship and trademark
law, and share the same weaknesses as the traditional likelihood of
confusion analysis.278
d. Regulatory Labeling Requirements
In theory, for certain media, consumers should be aware of what uses
are placed, and (by extension) be able to deduce which are not. In response
to the payola scandals of the 1950s,279 the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) instituted rules requiring network television and radio
stations to disclose any paid placements in a given program and list all
sponsors of the program.280 This regulation is quite limited in its scope:
First, of course, it applies only to broadcast television and radio.281 Second,
the rule does not require disclosure if the placed products are donated, if
the charge for exposure is nominal, or if the usage is for realistic effect.282
276. See Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 83,
96 (2006); Karrh et al., supra note 70 (citation omitted).
277. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
278. See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 79–80 (discussing weaknesses in trademark use
theory).
279. Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the
Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1696 n.47 (1997).
280. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2002) mandates:
(a) When a broadcast station transmits any matter for which money, service, or
other valuable consideration is either directly or indirectly paid or promised to,
or charged or accepted by such station, the station, at the time of the broadcast,
shall announce:
(1) That such matter is sponsored, paid for, or furnished, either in whole or in
part, and
(2) By whom or on whose behalf such consideration was supplied
....
(f) In the case of broadcast matter advertising commercial products or
services, an announcement stating the sponsor’s corporate or trade name, or the
name of the sponsor’s product, when it is clear that the mention of the name of
the product constitutes a sponsorship identification, shall be deemed sufficient
for the purposes of this section and only one such announcement need be made
at any time during the course of the broadcast.
281. In fact, the provision excludes works originally intended for theatrical release, even when
aired on broadcast television. Id. § 73.1212(h) (“Any announcement required by section 317(b) of
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is waived with respect to feature motion picture film
produced initially and primarily for theatre exhibition.”).
282. Id. § 73.1212(a)(2). The FCC expressly limits its regulatory reach:
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These FCC rules were designed to alert consumers of instances when
products were placed so that consumers would not fall prey to surreptitious
advertising; ironically, in light of the public’s growing awareness of
product placement in the current media landscape, consumers may now be
as likely to overestimate the proportion of products that are placed, rather
than underestimating.
Theoretically, the FCC rules could combat this new assumption because
consumers might assume that products and services were not placed if they
were not identified in a show’s credits. Realistically, however, this practice
is unlikely to allay consumer confusion or diminish content creators’ risk
aversion. Most people do not take great care in watching the credits of
television programs, especially given contemporary broadcasting practices
such as shrinking the credits and placing them in a split screen with
previews or advertisements. In addition, an ample body of case law and
survey evidence holds that inconspicuous disclaimers are ineffective at
allaying confusion.283
Provided, however. That ‘service or other valuable consideration’ shall not
include any service or property furnished either without or at a nominal charge
for use on, or in connection with, a broadcast unless it is so furnished in
consideration for an identification of any person, product, service, trademark,
or brand name beyond an identification reasonably related to the use of such
service or property on the broadcast.
Id. (emphasis added). Noting the prevalence of product placement and the limitations in the FCC’s
rules, some consumer advocacy groups have sought stricter regulation of the practice.
For example, on March 29, 1989, the Center for Science in the Public Interest
petitioned the FCC and the attorneys general in each state to require that paid
product placements be disclosed in the credits of all movies. . . . [O]n May 30,
1991, several public interest groups, including the Center for the Study of
Commercialism, filed a petition with the [Federal Trade Commission] (FTC) to
mandate that filmmakers must disclose paid product placements before a movie
is shown.
Savare, supra note 7, at 365. And on September 30, 2003, Commercial Alert petitioned both the
FCC and the FTC for “prominent disclosures of product placement, product integration, plot
placement, title placement, paid spokespersons, and virtual advertising on television.” Id. The FTC
has explicitly rejected this request, but has noted that “if, through a product placement, false or
misleading objective, material claims about a product’s attributes are made, the Commission can
take action against the advertiser through an enforcement action pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC
Act.” Richard A. Kurnit, Advertising and Promotion Liability (ALA-ABA Course of Study, Mar.
18–19, 2009), WL SP050 ALI-ABA 383, 418.
283. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
§ 23:51 (4th ed. 2009). In fact, even conspicuous disclaimers are often ineffective, since they
depend on short words and prefixes such as “not” and “un-”. In some instances, courts and studies
have noted that the presence of a disclaimer aggravates rather than alleviates confusion. Id. For this
reason, disclaimers are not a viable solution for content creators looking for a safe way to use marks
without authorization. Nor would it be possible (or wise) for a legal system to base infringement on
the presence or absence of disclaimers. First, as discussed, the disclaimers would be unlikely to
allay confusion. Second, even if any individual disclaimer did help to alleviate confusion for any
given unauthorized use, the practice of disclaiming authorization would actually tend to exacerbate
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Moreover, even if consumers did pay close attention to credits, they
could not fairly infer that all uncredited marks appear without
authorization. Because the FCC requires notification only when
promotional consideration has been provided,284 a wide array of placed
products may go uncredited, such as those for which consideration was inkind (e.g. the markholder provided products or services to the production
at little to no cost), or for which approval was obtained without
consideration. Second, the FCC’s rules apply only to broadcast
television.285 They do not (and cannot) apply to video games, music,
written work, or even filmed entertainment that was created for venues
other than broadcast television, such as theatrical release films or cable
television productions.286 Thus, consumers have no consistent source of
information from which they can learn to draw inferences regarding
sponsorship, approval, or affiliation.
In the face of pressure from consumer advocacy groups, the FCC is
currently seeking suggestions for strengthening its product placement
labeling requirements.287 Stronger FCC requirements are not likely to
diminish the overprotection and underprotection of the current trademark
scheme, however, because they cannot go far enough to clarify the law for
consumers or content creators. First, the FCC has limited regulatory power.
While the FCC may be able to mandate labeling of product placements in
programming created for broadcast television and radio (and, possibly,
cable television), the FCC lacks the power to regulate product placements
in other media.288 Thus, even the most stringent and broadly-applied
consumer confusion on a wider scale, unless everyone adopted the same practice. That is, if only
some content creators used disclaimers, consumers could easily come to ascribe meaning to the lack
of a disclaimer, believing that any content without a disclaimer was sponsored or approved by the
markholders. This would, in essence, convert an occasional practice into law, requiring content
creators to include disclaimers. While this may be practical for certain types of work (television,
feature films) it presents potentially insurmountable problems for others (still art, popular music).
And even for media such as television and feature films, for which disclaimers could be included in
credits, disclaimers will not allay confusion for viewers who see only a portion of the work unless
they are included contemporaneously with the showing of the mark. But requiring contemporaneous
disclaimers would be an outrageous burden on freedom of expression.
284. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(a).
285. Id. § 73.1212.
286. In fact, the provision excludes works originally intended for theatrical release, even when
aired on broadcast television. Id. § 73.1212(h) (“Any announcement required by § 317(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is waived with respect to feature motion picture film
produced initially and primarily for theatre exhibition.”).
287. Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,194,
43,196 (July 24, 2008).
288. See Comments of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, In the Matter of
Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, MB Docket No. 08-90, PLI Order
No. 18101 (Jan.–Mar., 2009).
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requirements would not be able to capture all authorized uses, and
consumers would never be able to rely on credits to conclude definitively
which mark uses were authorized. Second, as discussed above, disclaimers
may be ineffective and many people simply will not pay attention to
credits. This may not be a significant problem from a false advertising
perspective—the labeling aids those who care about surreptitious
advertising, and the remainder have only themselves to blame for their lack
of knowledge—but whereas false advertising law punishes only false or
misleading statements, trademark law may hold content creators liable for
consumers’ misperceptions even when the accused infringer has made a
full disclosure.
e. Rogers v. Grimaldi289
Finally, some courts have explicitly addressed First Amendment
concerns by applying the test set forth by the Second Circuit in the 1989
case of Rogers v. Grimaldi.290 In that case, Ginger Rogers sued the
producers of the film Ginger and Fred,291 alleging that the title of the film
was likely to confuse consumers into believing that she sponsored,
approved of, or was affiliated with the film.292 In reality, the film, which
was created and directed by Federico Fellini, concerned two dancers who
were nicknamed “Ginger and Fred” after the famous dancing duo.293 The
court found that there was a likelihood of confusion based on traditional
likelihood of confusion factors, but permitted the film to keep its
potentially confusing title on the basis that the public interest in free
expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding what the court
viewed as a relatively small likelihood of confusion.294 In so doing, the
court articulated the following balancing test to be applied to the titles of
expressive works: a relatively small likelihood of confusion may be
outweighed by the First Amendment, provided that the potentially
confusing title is (1) artistically relevant to the underlying work and (2) not
explicitly misleading.295
Although Rogers remains binding precedent only for the Second
Circuit, some other circuits have adopted its balancing test, albeit
inconsistently.296 Some courts have interpreted the test narrowly, holding
289. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
290. Id. at 999.
291. GINGER AND FRED (Bibo TV 1986).
292. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
293. Id. at 996–97.
294. Id. at 1001–02.
295. Id. at 999.
296. See supra note 55. Circuits that have adopted the test in some contexts have not uniformly
applied the rule to all First Amendment claims. Compare Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403–06 (9th Cir. 1997) (relying on pre-Rogers cases to reject a First
Amendment defense to trademark infringement regarding a book about O.J. Simpson styled after
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that it may not apply to non-titular uses of marks, while others have
applied it more broadly to the use of a mark in the body of an expressive
work.297 Still others have refused to apply it at all, either ignoring it or
hearkening back to the Dallas Cowboys case, in which the court held that a
“trademark is in the nature of a property right, and as such it need not
‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances
where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.’”298
Although the language of Rogers coincides with the artistic relevance
criteria identified by the social science literature above, the Rogers test as
articulated by the Second Circuit—and particularly, as interpreted by
courts that have followed it—falls short of permitting uses that are
artistically relevant and barring uses that are not (in fact, far from it). At its
heart, the Rogers test is a balancing test which balances likelihood of
confusion against the First Amendment interest in free expression.299 Thus,
the Second Circuit and several other circuits that have adopted the Rogers
balancing test have interpreted this to mean a “particularly compelling”
likelihood of confusion may overcome the First Amendment interest in
free expression.300 This modified version of the test requires completion of
The Cat in the Hat), and Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time Prods., B.V., 749 F. Supp. 1243,
1252–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that Rogers does not apply to “confusingly similar titles” and
holding that Rogers does not protect film Return from the River Kwai from claim by producers of
Bridge on the River Kwai), with Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that First Amendment does not protect use of mark in parodic context when the
use was likely to confuse and the “confusion [as opposed to the use of the mark] is wholly
unnecessary to [the alleged infringer’s] stated purpose”) (emphasis added), and Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) (suggesting the
“likelihood of confusion” test “serve[s] to avoid First Amendment concerns” in the case of
trademark parodies; holding First Amendment trumps any likelihood of confusion regarding parody
baseball cards without applying the Rogers standard).
297. See supra note 56.
298. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1979) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have
adopted the Rogers test, see, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452 (6th Cir. 2003);
Mattel II, 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214
F.3d 658, 664–65 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting Rogers standard with proviso that infringement will
still be found if likelihood of confusion is “particularly compelling”); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999, and
the Third Circuit has expressly declined to decide whether to adopt it, see Facenda v. N.F.L. Films,
Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) (explicitly declining to decide whether to adopt Rogers
standard). The question remains unsettled in other circuits. See, e.g., American Dairy Queen Corp.
v. New Line Prods., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733–35 (D. Minn. 1998) (relying on “alternative avenues”
test but referring to Rogers in discussion).
299. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (“We believe that in general the Act should be construed to apply
to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression.”).
300. The Second Circuit adopted the “particularly compelling” formulation in Twin Peaks
Prods. v. Publ’ns Int’l., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993). In Twin Peaks, the court remanded a
case on the basis that the district court, relying on Rogers to find non-infringement by a book title,
did not adequately consider whether there was likelihood of confusion that could nonetheless
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the full multi-factor likelihood of confusion test first, then an analysis of
First Amendment applicability, and only then a balancing of the two.301 For
example, in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.,302 the Fifth
Circuit held that there was a “particularly compelling” likelihood of
confusion between the title “Polo” for a luxury lifestyle magazine and the
Ralph Lauren “Polo” brand.303 This not only adds time and expense to any
litigation, but also adds ambiguity to the test. With certain liminal
exceptions, content creators are likely to know whether their use is
artistically relevant or explicitly misleading, but it is much harder for them
to assess—particularly in the current climate of doctrinal ambiguity and
recursive rights accretion—whether their use creates a “particularly
compelling” likelihood of confusion.304
B. Adjusting the Parameters
Although the Rogers balancing test does not, in its current form,
remedy the overprotection and potential underprotection built into the
current trademark system, its focus on artistic relevance does provide the
germ of a solution. Specifically, the “artistically relevant” prong of the
Rogers test echoes the findings of social science literature that artistically
gratuitous (i.e., incongruous) uses correlate with consumer confusion
and—importantly—correlate even more closely with trademark harm—
than artistically relevant uses.305
I propose, therefore, that the prongs of the Rogers test replace the
compel a finding of infringement. Id. The Fifth Circuit, and more than one district court in the
Ninth, have followed suit. See, e.g., Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664–68 (5th Cir. 2000); Toho
Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1212 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting First
Amendment defense in part based on holding that likelihood of confusion regarding “Godzilla” title
was particularly compelling); No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, 930 F. Supp. 1381, 1383–84 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) (explicitly adopting Rogers test including balance against particularly compelling
likelihood of confusion).
301. See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1379.
302. 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
303. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664–68.
304. Adding to the ambiguity of the as-applied Rogers test, some courts have interpreted the
second (“not explicitly misleading”) prong as requiring a complete likelihood of confusion analysis,
wherein a “particularly compelling” likelihood of confusion constitutes evidence that the use is
explicitly misleading. See, e.g., Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1379 (conflating likelihood of confusion
and explicitly misleading tests); Lemme v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 433, 446 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (applying “particularly compelling” analysis of Polaroid factors to determine whether title
was explicitly misleading); Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d
1068, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (interpreting Twin Peaks, in dicta, as having replaced the Rogers
court’s “explicitly misleading” test with the “particularly compelling” analysis). This interpretation
undercuts the original Rogers notion of a balancing test and tends to contradict the clear meaning of
the word “explicit.” In contrast to these outlying cases, this paper construes “explicitly misleading”
to have its ordinary meaning: a use is explicitly misleading when it makes an explicit and false
statement of sponsorship or approval by the markholder.
305. See supra Part III.A.1.
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traditional likelihood of confusion and dilution tests when marks are used
in expressive works. Uses would be permitted unless they are not (1)
artistically relevant to the underlying work or (2) explicitly misleading.
Only those uses in expressive works that are artistically gratuitous or
explicitly misleading, would be prohibited.
This proposed test will eliminate the bulk of the uses most likely to
cause trademark harm, while giving considerable leeway to content
creators. “Artistically relevant” is a very liberal standard, permitting uses
for purposes of authenticity, verisimilitude, symbolism, parody, and
expediency, for example. The Ninth Circuit made clear in its recent E.S.S.
Entertainment case that “only the use of a trademark with no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever does not merit First
Amendment protection. . . . In other words, the level of relevance merely
must be above zero.”306 This “more than zero percent relevant” test implies
(and I would make explicit) a presumption that a use is artistically relevant,
which may be rebutted only by evidence that a reasonable consumer would
perceive no artistic purpose for use of a mark.307 This analysis differs not
only from the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis, but also from the
306. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotations omitted). This interpretation is vastly preferable to the much more restrictive
interpretation given to the phrase in Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450–58 (6th Cir.
2003). In Parks, the Sixth Circuit found that the title Rosa Parks was not artistically relevant to a
song that contained the phrase “move to the back of the bus” on the basis that the song was not
about Rosa Parks, but was rather a bragging song about the artists themselves. Id. at 452–53. This
holding was based in part on testimony from the artists themselves that the song was not about Rosa
Parks. Id. One of the more significant problems with the holding in Parks was the court’s reliance
on artist testimony because trademark harm is a matter of consumer perception; the question of
artistic relevance, like the question of likelihood of confusion, must be assessed from the standpoint
of the reasonable consumer, not the artist. Thus, while artist testimony may (under some
circumstances) be admissible evidence of artistic relevance, it cannot be dispositive and may be
unduly prejudicial. Under the more recent Ninth Circuit standard that I espouse, Parks would be
decided differently: it seems implausible that a reasonable consumer would find the title Rosa Parks
to be zero percent relevant to a song containing the phrase “move to the back of the bus.”
307. Under this test, the Caterpillar case presents one of the very few instances in which a
court would likely find a lack of artistic relevance. That film concerned a fantasy world, not
designed to represent or replicate real life, which the court described as a “live-action cartoon.”
There was no reason for verisimilitude, and no other reason for the menacing bulldozers to be
branded. Nor, in fact, was branding required by expediency: nearly every shot in which Caterpillar’s
brand was visible could have been done with equal effectiveness without showing a brand name,
simply by showing the right side of the bulldozer rather than the left. It is thus plausible that
Caterpillar could have established a lack of artistic relevance for the use of the Caterpillar mark in
that case. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Company, 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2003). In
contrast, the contemporaneous Wham-O case would likely remain unchanged under this proposal,
as the movie had an artistically relevant purpose for showing the trade dress of the Slip-n-Slide
toy—to show the main character learning to use a real world child’s toy—and the use of the toy’s
name in dialog (while it may be slightly less important from an artistic standpoint) would constitute
nominative fair use. Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
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analysis in the Dallas Cowboys case, which holds that the First
Amendment does not protect the use of a mark when “adequate alternative
avenues of communication exist.”308 The Dallas Cowboys rule would
create a presumption of infringement in any case in which adequate
alternative avenues of communication exist, regardless of whether the use
of the mark caused confusion or trademark harm. In contrast, the test
proposed herein would create a presumption of non-infringement,
rebuttable only by evidence that the use of a mark was artistically
irrelevant or explicitly misleading.309
Similarly, the limitation that misleading uses will be prohibited only if
they are explicitly misleading means that content creators need only avoid
explicit statements of sponsorship, affiliation, and approval, and need not
be concerned with the degree to which consumers could infer sponsorship,
affiliation, or approval from any given use. Nevertheless, this prong insures
that a likelihood of confusion will be found if a work contains false
representations about sponsorship, approval, or affiliation.310 This prevents
uses that, even if artistically relevant, are sure to mislead the consumer into
believing that the use has been sponsored or approved by the markholder.
While such uses are likely to be rare, they may occur when the expressive
work states falsely that the markholder has sponsored the mark’s
appearance or explicitly calls out the mark as part of promoting the
work.311 Thus, even when a mark is used in an artistically relevant way,
content creators will not be able to mislead consumers regarding
sponsorship.
308. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1979). Commentators have rightly criticized the Dallas Cowboys case on the basis that its rule
would create a property-type right in trademarks, subject to trespass even in the absence of
trademark harm, in conflict with the tenet that a trademark is not a right in gross. See, e.g.,
Gulasekaram, supra note 6, at 890–91.
309. This is not to say, however, that Dallas Cowboys would have come out differently under
the proposed analysis. At the outset, the packaging for the film Debbie Does Dallas was explicitly
misleading in its statement that the film featured an “Ex Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader” (when “Dallas
Cowgirl” was a known nickname for the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleading organization). Even if the
packaging were not explicitly misleading, the case contained no indication that the film’s costuming
use of uniforms strikingly similar to those worn by the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders had any
artistic relevance whatsoever. Id. Thus, it is plausible to believe that the Dallas Cowboys could have
rebutted a presumption of artistic relevance and established infringement even under the
replacement test.
310. If, for example, the television show 30 Rock had not received payment from Verizon for
featuring its product, the line “can we have our money now” would have explicitly misled viewers
into believing that the mark’s appearance was sponsored. See supra note 102.
311. For example, the promotional statements at issue in Dallas Cowboys were that the film
Debbie Does Dallas starred an “Ex Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader” and that viewers would “do more
than cheer for this X Dallas Cheerleader.”As the phrase “Dallas Cowgirl” is commonly used to refer
to Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, the promotion explicitly misled viewers into the false impression
that the film featured a (current or former) Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d
at 203.
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The proposed replacement test would improve upon the current system
in a number of ways. First, it avoids overprotection and underprotection by
focusing on the uses most likely to cause trademark harm, rather than the
uses most likely to cause confusion. This permits uses that might confuse
but be innocuous or beneficial from the perspective of trademark value,
while prohibiting uses that are not likely to confuse, but are likely to cause
trademark harm, such as gratuitous negative depictions of marks.312 Thus,
it would address both the underprotection and overprotection issues
discussed above. Uses that are unlikely to cause confusion harm would be
permitted, without diminishing the scope of the likelihood of confusion
standard (as it applies to non-expressive uses). Along the same lines, uses
that are most likely to cause tarnishment-type harm (i.e., artistically
gratuitous uses) will be newly captured by the replacement test, without
requiring any expansion to the scope of likelihood of confusion or dilution
law. Since artistically relevant uses will be permitted, the rule will not
undermine the policy behind dilution law’s exception for non-commercial
uses.
In addition, the replacement test would identify uses likely to cause
trademark harm, without having to rely on consumers’ shifting awareness
of product placement and mark licensing to define the scope of protection.
It would also avoid the distortive effect of relying on consumers’ own
understanding of the law to define the scope of protection.313 These
benefits would, in turn, reduce the recursive growth effect of consumer
knowledge on the scope of trademark protection. Along the same lines, it
would also reduce the need for some of the expression-constraining riskaverse behaviors that feed that recursive growth, such as blurring marks
and creating brand-less replacement goods. In the circumstances under
which conspicuous avoidance of brands is most common (for example,
documentaries, demonstration shows, music video scenes of street or club
life), such uses would be artistically relevant for purposes of verisimilitude,
and therefore permitted. This does not mean that content creators will
never wish to blur marks or avoid brands—they may want to avoid giving
free publicity to a brand, for example, or they may want to convey an
atmosphere of brandless-ness or unreality—but it makes these decisions
choices, rather than necessities. And when content creators do choose to
engage in conspicuous avoidance of branding, it will not have the effect of
expanding trademark law.
The move from an ambiguous standard to a brighter-line rule also
improves predictability. Much has been written about the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of rules versus standards.314 The central axis
312. See supra Part III.A.1.
313. See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989), quoting 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 24:3, at 170.
314. The literature on this topic is extensive. See, e.g, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
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of this long-standing debate is the trade-off between predictability and
flexibility: as defined, “rules” are bright-line prescriptions or proscriptions,
while “standards” are case-by-case decision-making criteria. (Contrast, for
example, a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit with one that requires drivers to
maintain a “safe” speed.) Both rules and standards are subject to critique—
rules are predictable and inexpensive to enforce, but their lack of flexibility
may lead to inappropriate or costly outcomes. By the same token, standards
are better tailored to individual outcomes, but are more costly to enforce,
and are also subject to the costs associated with unpredictability and
uncertainty. The likelihood of confusion system currently in place is, for
the most part, a standard. Its flexibility may be a virtue when assessing
individualized and fact-specific cases of passing off, when courts may be
required to exercise discretion. When transposed into the context of
expressive works, however, that same flexibility and unpredictability lead
to risk aversion and chilled speech. A preferable system would embody the
advantages of both rules and standards: it would predictably permit most
uses (alleviating risk aversion), while retaining the flexibility to prohibit
uses that will cause trademark harm. To this end, the replacement test I
propose for evaluating trademark uses in the context of expressive works
more closely resembles a rule, although it continues to embed the (mildly)
subjective artistic relevance standard.315
The proposed replacement test’s improved predictability also stems, in
large part, from enhanced clarity. By asking only whether a use is
artistically relevant or explicitly misleading, the test is simpler and more
easily applied. It avoids the morass of the Sleekcraft multi-factor test,
which is a poor fit for questions of sponsorship or approval (having been
designed to address cases of passing off),316 and shuns the expansive
vagueness of courts that have asked directly whether a use has signaled
“some connection” between markholder and alleged infringer,317 or could
lead consumers to believe that the markholder “goes along” with the use of
the mark.318 As James Gibson has discussed in detail, much of the current
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783–91 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592–93 (1988); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards,
33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
The debate has taken hold in the copyright and patent literature, as well. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (Nov. 2003); Michael W.
Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (May 2007) (copyright). In contrast, there has been
relatively little discussion of rules versus standards in the trademark context. Cf. Dinwoodie &
Janis, supra note 266.
315. See Korobkin, supra note 314, at 27–28 (discussing rule-standard spectrum).
316. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979); see supra,
Part I.
317. See, e.g., Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 34.
318. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400–01 (8th Cir. 1987). See also
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problem with rights accretion can be traced in large part to ambiguity—
because the Sleekcraft test does not map well onto expressive uses of
marks and because courts use imprecise language, content creators and
insurance carriers do not know what the law is, and trend toward risk
aversion. 319 Increased clarity in the law would tend to reverse that trend
because if the law is more predictable, content creators will feel freer to
use marks in appropriate contexts.
This is not to say that the replacement test lacks ambiguity, which is a
price of maintaining flexibility.320 Whether a use is “artistically relevant”—
even using the extremely liberal standard for artistic relevance set by the
Ninth Circuit—is a subjective question that some might hesitate to leave in
the hands of the courts. The application of a presumption of artistic
relevance takes much of the subjectivity out of the hands of the court,
however, as does the requirement that only explicitly misleading uses will
qualify as misleading. Moreover, even to the extent that some ambiguity
remains, the artistic relevance test is no more ambiguous than the test
currently in effect. In the First Amendment context—which most, if not all,
of the cases to be addressed by the replacement test would fit into—the
Rogers approach would force a court to answer the question of artistic
relevance anyway. What the replacement test does, in addition to adding a
Gibson, supra note 5, at 909 (discussing the expanding effect of imprecise vocabulary and
marshaling cases’ reliance on expansive and ambiguous terms such as “endorsement,” “affiliation,”
“association,” “connection,” “authorization,” “permission,” “license, “of any kind,” “otherwise,”
“in some other way,” “of some sort, “in some way,” and “in some fashion”).
319. Gibson has advocated increased litigation as a tool for clarifying the law. As more courts
interpret the law, he suggests, content creators will develop an understanding of which uses are
permitted, and which uses are not. Gibson, supra note 5, at 939–42. But increased litigation is at
best a slow route to improvement, and at worst an aggravating factor as courts decide cases
inconsistently and open up greater ambiguities in the law. In addition, lowering barriers to litigation
will only increase content creators’ fear of litigation. In the “license, don’t litigate” culture of
entertainment, the prospect of litigation is stifling even when that litigation is likely to have a
favorable result. In addition, a rise in litigation does not necessarily lead to a rise in court rulings.
Most cases regarding the use of marks in films settle before receiving an order on the merits (but not
after both parties have incurred significant expense). See Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80,
at 14 (“There are, however, surprisingly few cases involving disputes over the unauthorized use of
trademarked products in entertainment programming because many of them are settled out of
court.”). Regardless, giving content creators the choice between licensing and litigation continues to
increase transaction costs in a way that disproportionately harms small and independent content
creators. It would be preferable to clarify the law in a way that does not require the threat of cash
outlay by content creators.
320. William McGeveran has discussed a number of ambiguities and perceived flaws with the
Rogers test in his article Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, supra note 11, at 100–04. Perhaps the
greatest of these, that “confusion avoidance apparently has dropped out of the standard,” is
addressed by the social science research discussed above. The majority of his other critiques are
resolved by applying a presumption of artistic relevance and divorcing the two-prong test from the
balancing procedure described in Rogers and its progeny. Without doubt, however, the test I
propose maintains a certain level of ambiguity. I posit, however, that that ambiguity is both
unavoidable and relatively mild.
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presumption of artistic relevance, is eliminate the second layer of
ambiguity from such cases by removing the likelihood of confusion
balancing analysis from the Rogers test.
The combination of a simpler, clearer rule and a presumption of artistic
relevance will also discourage aggressive litigation, which in turn will help
alleviate risk aversion. Much of the current problem is caused not by the
breadth of the law per se, but by markholders’ perception that the law is
broad enough to permit widespread enforcement, and the responsiveness
(to the point of anticipatory avoidance) of content creators and insurance
carriers to threats of enforcement. Traditional responses to these concerns
include fee-shifting and reduced penalties. James Gibson, for example,
proposes shifting penalties for expressive trademark violations away from
injunctive relief.321 These options, however, are inadvisable here; fee
shifting (whether under an “exceptional case” rule, similar to that already
in place, or a more generous “loser-pays” system) takes away some of the
incentive for plaintiffs to roll the dice on marginal cases, but still permits
optimistic plaintiffs to believe that they will never have to pay more than
their own fees. In addition, fee-shifting takes place too late, after litigation
has ended and a defendant has already had to shoulder all of the expense of
litigation defense (even a successful one). Thus, while it may discourage
some frivolous litigation on the margins, fee shifting is unlikely to resolve
the risk aversion problem.
Limiting the availability of injunctive relief is even more problematic in
the trademark context because injunctions are at the core of trademark
relief. Unlike other intellectual property violations, the loss of goodwill
from exposure is the harm of trademark infringement, so the remedy for
trademark infringement, with certain exceptions, is the cessation of
infringement.322 In cases of passing off, some losses may be compensable
along the lines of lost profits, but such compensation is difficult to assess
and is generally not available except in cases of willful infringement (when
treble damages and attorney fees are available).323 Thus, to discourage
excessive litigation in this context, the best approach is to make the
prospect of profiting from borderline litigation less likely for plaintiffs. The
presumption accomplishes this goal. By clarifying which uses are and are
not permitted, the replacement test better allows borderline and infringing
cases to be identified and frees up resources that can be used for licensing
them—as opposed to using those funds for licensing clearly permissible
uses or for fighting over clearly impermissible uses.
321. Gibson, supra note 5, at 943–44.
322. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting
injunction is “the remedy of choice for trademark” cases).
323. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (providing for lost profits, damages, and costs, as well as treble
damages and attorney fees for willful infringement); see Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d
168, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting willfulness not required, but still a factor, in assessing whether
damages are available).
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To the extent that consumers believe that every use of a mark in an
expressive work represents a sponsored or approved use, this test would
abide a certain amount of consumer confusion, on the theory that such
confusion is unlikely to cause trademark harm. In this way, it differs
significantly from the Rogers balancing test on which it is based. The
Rogers test (as most courts apply it) would evaluate artistic relevance—and
then would add another layer of inquiry, asking whether there is a
“particularly compelling” likelihood of confusion that might outweigh the
free-expression interest in the artistically relevant use of a mark. But this
additional step is both unnecessary and harmful. It is unnecessary, because
while it might identify additional confusing uses, it will not identify
additional harmful ones.324 It is also harmful because it injects the
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis back into the mix—and with it,
all of the ambiguity, risk aversion, and rights-expansion of that analysis.
The proposed replacement test may also tolerate a certain amount of
trademark harm, to the extent that the “artistically relevant” standard does
not map perfectly on to the social science concept of “congruence.”
Specifically, uses that do not qualify as artistically relevant under the
liberal standard described here (for example, the gratuitous use of a
modern-day brand in a period piece) will almost certainly be incongruent;
however, the liberal standard for artistic relevance may occasionally permit
some incongruent uses as well (for example, focus on a branded product
for the purpose of making an artistically relevant reference to the brand’s
cultural meaning, when the product would otherwise serve an accessory
role to the story). Although these artistically relevant incongruous uses may
create some consumer confusion and trademark harm, the benefits to free
expression far outweigh the likelihood of confusion in such instances. The
(relatively few) incongruent uses that will be allowed under this standard
are those consistent with the policy that trademark law should not be able
to remove brands and their cultural meanings from the collective
vocabulary. Moreover, as such uses become expressly permitted and thus
more commonplace, consumer assumptions regarding product placement
will gradually shift to include a concept of brand reference outside of
product placement. This will allay any confusing or harmful effect that
such uses might have.325 Thus, any confusion that would be permitted by
this test—even if it may occasionally lead to a small degree of trademark
harm—is outweighed by its benefits in free expression and doctrinal
stability.

324. See supra Part III.A.1.
325. See, e.g., DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 77, 79 (indicating negative consumer
responses due to incongruence are generally tied to assumptions regarding promotion intent).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The current trademark system, in conjunction with the “clearance
culture,” chills expressive speech by overprotecting marks, while at the
same time underprotecting against certain harmful uses of marks in the
expressive context. Specifically, overprotection occurs as the scope of
trademark protection grows recursively—the traditional likelihood of
confusion test evaluates consumer confusion as to sponsorship or approval,
which is more likely to happen as consumers become increasingly aware of
product placement and mark licensing practices in entertainment. As a
result of this expanding likelihood of confusion, risk-averse content
creators are faced with a binary choice: sacrifice creative control to
markholders or avoid the use of marks altogether. This has a speechchilling effect that falls disproportionately on small and independent
content creators, who cannot afford to obtain authorization and cannot
guarantee the audience required for product placement. Many riskavoidance techniques used by content creators, such as creating fake
brands and blurring unauthorized marks, tend to reinforce consumers’
assumptions that all perceptible trademark uses are sponsored or approved
by markholders. This, in turn, expands likelihood of confusion.
At the same time, the trademark system underprotects marks by
permitting uses—such as negative depictions of marks—that are unlikely
to cause consumer confusion, but still likely to harm the mark. This occurs
because the traditional likelihood of confusion test will not capture nonconfusing uses, and the traditional dilution test will capture neither noncommercial uses (i.e., most unauthorized entertainment uses) nor uses
likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s mark (rather than
its product or service). This means that potentially harmful depictions of
marks are allowed to continue, while benign (or even beneficial) uses are
chilled. As a result, the system deprives content creators of the ability to
use marks as expressive tools while continuing to leave markholders open
to trademark harm.
The current likelihood of confusion and dilution systems underlie this
doctrinal imbalance, partly because they rely on ambiguous tests and
exceptions, and partly because they focus on the wrong factors for
identifying trademark harm. Recent studies indicate that consumer attitudes
toward the use of trademarks in entertainment depend more on whether the
use is artistically relevant than on whether the depiction satisfies the
likelihood of confusion test. Specifically, when the use of a mark is
incongruous with the underlying work (i.e., artistically irrelevant),
consumers are not only likely to believe that the use of the mark is
sponsored or approved by the markholder, but are also likely to develop
negative attitudes toward the mark. In contrast, when the use of a mark is
artistically relevant, consumers are likely to develop a positive attitude
toward the mark regardless of whether the mark is depicted in a positive or
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negative manner.
Therefore, in this Article, I have proposed that when a mark is used in
an expressive setting, the traditional likelihood of confusion tests should be
replaced with a two-pronged test, under which an unauthorized use would
be permitted unless the use is (1) not artistically relevant to the underlying
work or (2) explicitly misleading. This test is based on factors identified in
Rogers v. Grimaldi, but simplifies and clarifies that case’s analysis
considerably by eliminating the need for a likelihood of confusion analysis
and by applying a presumption of artistic relevance. This proposed test
would permit the use of marks as expressive tools, while encouraging
content creators to seek permission for uses that are more likely to harm a
mark’s source-identifying function. In addition, this test would identify the
uses most likely to cause trademark harm without relying on consumers’
shifting awareness of product placement and mark licensing to define the
scope of protection. This, combined with the proposed test’s improved
clarity and predictability, would reduce markholders’ incentives to litigate
and mitigate content creators’ risk aversion, short-circuiting the vicious
cycle of trademark rights expansion.
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